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LAW AND LITERATURE: AN UNNECESSARILY
SUSPECT CLASS IN THE LIBERAL ARTS
COMPONENT OF THE LAW SCHOOL

CURRICULUM
ELIZABETH VILLIERS GEMMETTE*

Note too that a faithful study of
the liberal arts humanizes character
and permits it not to be cruel.
Ovid, Ex Ponto Ib. ix, 47
I.

INTRODUCTION

This study began out of an idiosyncratic desire to know if-and if, to
what extent-Law and Literature and Law and Psychology were offered
within the law school curriculum. During the summer of 1987, questionnaires were sent to 175 American Bar Association (ABA) accredited institutions asking for information on their offerings in these two areas. The
questionnaires on both Law and Literature and Law and Psychology asked
the following basic questions: Does your school offer such a course? What
is the title of the course? How often is the course offered? To whom is the
course offered? What is the approximate enrollment? Do any or all of the
instructors have terminal degrees in the subject area? What is the objective
of the school and/or the professor in teaching this course? What works are
included on the reading list of your existing course?
One hundred and thirty-five schools responded to the Law and Literature questionnaire and approximately the same number responded to the
questionnaire on Law and Psychology. It was readily apparent from the
data collected on Law and Literature that the courses taught in that area
broke down into three sub-categories: Law in Literature,' Literature in
* Union College (B.S., 1979); College of St. Rose (M.A., 1981); State University of
New York at Albany (D.A., 1984); Albany Law School (J.D., June, 1989). Dr. Gemmette has
taught English at the State University of New York at Albany and English and Psychology at
Schenectady County Community College.
1. Law in Literature courses utilize fiction and are usually organized thematically to
show the lawyer or the legal system as they are reflected through the eyes of the novelist, short
story writer, dramatist or poet.
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Law,2 and The Legal Imagination.3 It was equally apparent that the data
gathered on Law and Psychology was not amenable to such discrete categorization. Representative titles included the following: Law and Psychiatry,
Psychology of the Courtroom, Law and Psychoanalysis, Psychology and the
Trial Process, Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence, Mental Health Issues and Law, and Law and Social Science. Therefore, for obvious reasons,
this part of the study was set aside leaving the emphasis on Law and Literature. Nevertheless, at the same time that the study was narrowing, it was
further expanding to accommodate the suggestions of several respondents to
the first set of questionnaires.
The second request for data asked administrators of the same 175
ABA approved law schools to provide a list of their courses that focused
upon the Liberal Arts. The categories provided were as follows: Social Sciences-Economics, Mental Health, Political Science, Psychiatry, Psychology, and Sociology; Humanities-History, Law and Humanities, Law and
Literature (subdivided into Law in/and Literature, Literature in Law, and
The Legal Imagination), and Philosophy (subdivided into Critical Legal
Studies (CLS), Jurisprudence, Theology, and all other Philosophy courses).
Seventy-six schools responded to this second survey.4 The data which was
received in response to this survey will be referred to from time to time as
the roles of the Social Sciences and Humanities in the law school curriculum are discussed.
The responses to the Law and Literature survey are detailed in Appendix I. Of the 135 schools which responded to the initial survey, thirty-eight
reported offering a course under the general heading of "Law and Literature." In fact, "Law and Literature" was the actual title of most of these
courses. The few notable exceptions were as follows: Harvard-"Dickens
2. Literature in Law courses emphasize the literary characteristics of statutes, constitutions and judicial opinions. Cardozo's works are the primary example of the latter. See SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO (Margaret E. Hall ed. 1947).
3. See JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973) [hereinafter WHITE]. This
work, which has been used as a textbook and which lends its name to some law school courses,
deals with literary and legal langauge and style. See also Axelrod, Law and the Humanities:
Notes from the Underground, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 228, (1976) (for the notion that all the
humanities can bring to law is style). "As I said before 'only style'; but that may be all there
is," id. at 236.
4. Most of the lists were completed by law school personnel. Half a dozen or so
schools sent catalogues and those were used to complete the respective questionnaires. It was
apparent from the responses that some lists were over-inclusive in some areas and others were
under-inclusive. This was, of course, due to the inability to design satisfactory rubrics under
which to break down the whole of the social sciences and the humanities without overlap or
exclusion. For the purposes of this study, the responses taken as a whole do show the strong
emphasis on the social sciences to the exclusion of the humanities. The data collected has been
consolidated into an eighty-six page reference guide which was utilized during the preparation
of this article. The author would be pleased to share this information upon request.
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and the Law"; The University of Alabama and The University of
Iowa-"Law in Literature"; 5 The University of Bridgeport--"Law and the
Humanities"; The University of California/Davis and The University of
Tennessee--"The Legal Imagination";' The University of Maryland- "Jurisprudence in Literature" and "The Idea of Law in Western Culture";
University of Pittsburgh-"Literature and the Law"; 7 University of Puget
Sound--"Language and the Law." Appendix I isself-explanatory. Data regarding reading lists and other materials-when provided-is capsulized in
the comments at the end of each listing. Publications relevant to Law and
Literature are also included in this section. Appendix I will be referred to
throughout this paper.
Appendix II is a cumulative bibliography of the books included on all
of the reading lists. This bibliography includes fiction-novels, plays, short
stores, librettos, poems, operas, sagas-and non-fiction-letters, biography,
history, trials, autobiographies, and philosophy; critical works; bibliographies and edited collections. 8 This list differs from the many which have
been published during the eighty years since Wigmore first published his
list of legal novels 9 in that this list represents those books actually used as
texts by Law and Literature professors. For further illumination as to the
preferences of such professors, a compilation of the frequency with which
those works of fiction were cited follows the fiction listing.
The collection and organization of the data received in response to the
above-mentioned surveys raised a number of questions which the remainder
of this paper will address. Generally, the emphasis will be on three major
themes. First of all, the article will briefly examine the historical role of the
liberal arts in the law school curriculum.' 0 Secondly, the article will focus
5. These courses are of the same type as those entitled "Law and Literature."
6. See WHITE, supra note 3. Note that only two courses are entitled "The Legal Imagination." As it seemed possible that recipients of the Law and Literature survey did not
include courses entitled "The Legal Imagination," I contacted the publisher, Little Brown.
They indicated that about 172 copies of "The Legal Imagination" were sold in 1986 and only
about 72 copies were sold in 1987. They believed that about five schools bought these texts.
7. Again this course is of the same type as "Law and Literature" and "Law in Literature" courses.
8. All of the reading lists provided by Law and Literature professors were combed to
put together this bibliography. A cumulative bibliography appeared to be preferable rather
than showing what each professor had selected for his/her own reading list. It seemed inappropriate to expose a course as afait accompli, although the readiness with which these professors
shared their thoughts, insights, reading lists, and objectives was overwhelming.
9. Wigmore, A List of Legal Novels, 2 ILL. L. REV. 574 (1908).
10. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850s TO THE 1980s (1983) [hereinafter STEVENS]. For reviews of Stevens' book see Feldman
& Feinman, Legal Education. Its Cause and Cure, 82 MICH. L. REV. 914 (1984); Shreve,
History of Legal Education, 97 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1983). See also ALBERT J. HARNO,
LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1953); S.MENTSCHIKOFF & I. STOTZKY, THE
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on the three major movements in the liberal arts component of the law
school curriculum: Law and Economics,"" Critical Legal Studies," and Law
and Literature."' This turn to the Law and Literature Movement begins
with an analysis of the confrontation between the Law and Literature
Movement and the Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies Movements. Finally, it proceeds to a detailed discussion of the two branches of
the Law and Literature Movement; namely, the Fiction and the Law
Branch and the Critical Branch. The article concludes with the reminder
that law school is both a professional and an academic pursuit in which
Law and Literature should be a pivotal course in the Law School
curriculum.
On a more specific level, this paper will deal with narrower issues regarding Law and Literature. Attention will be paid to the bibliographies
and lists relating to law and literature which have proliferated since the
first list by Wigmore in 1908.14 Consideration will then be given to the
earlier but later relinquished idea that a man of the law should also be a
man of letters. 15 A justification for the Law and Literature Movement will
be offered, particularly a justification and rationale for the teaching of Law
and Literature in the law school curriculum. This offered justification will
be two-fold. First, it will be a justification for the inclusion of the traditional law and literature course taught mostly with the aid of fiction. Second, it will recommend that the practice of looking at literary criticism as a
tool for legal interpretation should be freely introduced into the law school
curriculum"" by the inclusion of a course which embraces New Critical
THEORY AND CRAFT OF AMERICAN LAW (1981); Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71
IOWA L. REV. 1063 (1986); Weistart, The Law School Curriculum The Process of Reform,
1987 DUKE L.J. 317.
11. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV.

L. REV. 761 (1987).
12. Posner includes the Law and Economics Movement and the Critical Legal Studies
Movement in his analysis of current political opinion in law schools: "The spectrum of political
opinion in law schools, which in 1960 occupied a narrow band between mild liberalism and
mild conservatism, today runs from Marxism, feminism, and left wing nihilism and anarchism
on the left to economic and political libertarianism and Christian fundamentalism on the
right." Id. at 766.
13. The Law and Literature Movement branches off into the teaching of law and literature and the critical discourse on the role of literary criticism as a tool for legal analysis.
14. Beginning with Wigmore, supra note 9, and ending with Morse & Bourguignon,
Criminals in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century American Law and Literature:An Essay and
Annotated Bibliography, 79 L. LIBR. J. 639 (1987).
15. See R. A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984).
16. See Appendix I-American University, Washington College of Law, Pace University, Tulane University, The University of Maryland, The University of Puget Sound, The

University of South Carolina and Yeshiva University for inroads into the teaching of literary
criticism coupled with legal interpretation.
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Theory,1 7 rejects both the "Intentional Fallacy" and the "Affective Fallacy,"' 8 and elevates the status of the reader.' 9 Although the inclusion of
competing literary theories seems contradictory, I will argue that these aspects of literary criticism are not mutually exclusive and that it is the very
diversity of these methods of interpretation which could, and should, be
used to expose students to the process of actively reading and interacting
with a literary text. That activity could then be adopted to allow the students to read a legal text with the aim of making the text the "best it can
20
be."
II.

THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE LIBERAL ARTS IN THE LAW SCHOOL
CURRICULUM

Until the publication of Stevens' book Law School: Legal Education in
America from the 1850s to the 1980s,2 1 material dealing with the topic of
American legal education was scarce. 2 Thus, it is to Stevens that we turn
to learn the historical role of the Liberal Arts in the law school curriculum.
Keeping in mind that the private Lichfield Law School established in Connecticut in 1784 claimed to teach law as a sciences and that by the 1870s
law schools were considered to be "primarily trade schools" 2 4-whose role
was not to attend to "the elegant training of the mind, ' 2 5 but rather to be
"in competition for students with the four-year liberal arts curriculum,"'16-it comes as no surprise to find resistance on the part of law school
administrators and faculties to the inclusion of social sciences and humanities in their curriculum. This scientific, anti-liberal arts approach continued
For an introduction into New Critical Theory see C. BROOKS, THE WELL
(1947).
18. But see W. WIMSATr, JR. & M. BEARDSLEY, The Intentional Fallacy and The
Affective Fallacy in THE VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY (1954). The
"intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success
Id. at 3.
of a work of literary art ....
The Affective Fallacy is a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is and
what it does) . . . . It begins by trying to derive the standards of criticism from the
psychological effects of the poem and ends in impressionism and relativism. The outcome
of either Fallacy, The Intentional or the Affective, is that the poem itself, as an object of
specifically critical judgment, tends to disappear, . . .
Id. at 21.
19. For an introduction to reader-response criticism see READER-RESPONSE CRITCISM:
FROM FORMALISM TO POST-STRUCTURALISM (J. Tompkins ed. 1980).
20. The term is borrowed from Dworkin. See Dworkin, Law As Interpretation,60 TEx.
L. REV. 527, 541 n.6 (1982).
21. Stevens, supra note 10.
22. But see note 10, supra for helpful supplemental materials.
23. Stevens, supra note 10, at 3-4.
24. Id. at 35.
25. Id.
26. Id.
17.

WROUGHT URN; STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF POETRY
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throughout the founding and early days of Harvard. Later, when Harvard
became involved in the subsequent founding of the University of Chicago
Law School in 1900, a suggestion was made that taxation, constitutional
law, jurisprudence, and Roman law should be included as electives in the
Chicago curriculum 2 7 To this suggestion, however, Harvard's Dean Ames
made the predictable statement: "We are unanimously opposed to the
teaching of anything but pure law in our department."2 8 This concern with
law as a science led to Harvard's case method, now known as the Socratic
method.2 9 With this strong emphasis on law as a science, together with the
entrenchment of the Socratic method, it was not until 1916 that we saw the
"social sciences . . . [begin] to affect the increasingly ivory-towered law
school."'80 But it was from Yale, not Harvard, that the tilt in this direction
came.
Under the guidance of the Dean of Yale Law School, Thomas Swan, a
proposal was sent to the President of Yale suggesting that the Yale Law
School should be expanded into the Yale School of Law and Jurisprudence.8 ' As Stevens notes, legal education faced the dilemma which it still
faces today: "Was the law school essentially a professional school, or was it
instead an academic area of the university? Or was it both? Dean Swan
would have responded that a law school had a moral duty to fulfill both
functions.""2
Although Yale's vision did not materialize, Columbia was flirting with
its own vision of a redesigned curriculum which, although also unsuccessful,
did successfully challenge pre-existing assumptions about legal education.
As the Columbia faculty noted: "[T]he time has come for at least one
school to become a 'community of scholars.' "" But the time was not ripe:
When Columbia's flirtation with the social sciences failed, Dean Smith
"spent much of his report for 1930 explaining that the integration of law
34
and social science was easier said than done.
The next impetus for change in the law school curriculum appears to
have been presented by the advocates of the realist movement whose major
achievement, according to Stevens, was "kill[ing] the Langdellian notion of
law as an exact science, based on the objectivity of black-letter rules."13 5 By

THE

27.
28.
1890s
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 40.
R. STEVENS,
40 (1983).
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 135.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 156.

LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
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the 1920s and 1930s, with the notion of the law no longer tied exclusively to
science, an attempt to integrate law and social science was made. Social
scientists joined the faculty at Yale and Columbia and case books began to
include materials bearing witness to functionalism. 6 Following shortly on
this change affecting law school eduction-beginning in 1937 and lasting
until 1949-Chicago offered a four-year curriculum which included courses
in psychology, English constitutional history, economic theory, accounting,
political theory, and ethics.3 7 Yet in spite of these moves toward the social
sciences, Stevens tells us that following World War II, during the late
1940s, the 1950s and the 1960s, suggestions for curricular reform were
merely repetitions of the failed experiments of the 1920s and 1930s. "Stress
on the need to integrate law and social sciences had not diminished, but,
except for a few productive fields, little effective progress was made."38

III. THE THREE MAJOR MOVEMENTS: LAW AND ECONOMICS, CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES, AND LAW AND LITERATURE

As reviewers of Stevens' book point out, Stevens' history is most effective and complete up to the period of the 1950s. After that period he leaves
us with a sketchy, fragmented and dismal view of American legal education 39 -"an account which testifies to the schizophrenia of law schools,
comfortable neither in the academy [n]or the profession."'4 "It remains to
be seen whether Stevens' perception of fragmentation [and schizophrenia]
is correct or whether his failure to provide a unifying theme for the events
of recent decades is attributable simply to the increasing difficulty of organizing and appraising facts as the historian draws nearer to his own
time."" 1
Shreve sees Stevens' pessimism and his failure to take a closer examination of law school teaching as minor weak points of Stevens' total work.'
However, Shreve notes in contradiction of Stevens' position:
Although observers have not favorably regarded all developments in legal education since 1970, the rise of 'critical legal
studies,' the attempted integration of law and economics, and
the 'search for a new form of [unifying] faith'-each of which
Stevens himself describes-suggest that reforms in legal educa36.

Id. at 158.

37. Id. at 159.
38. Id. at 210-11.

39.
40.
41.
42.

Shreve, supra note 10, at 604.
Feldman and Feinman, supra note 10, at 930-31.
Shreve, supra note 10, at 604.
Id. at 605.
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tion are not inevitably 'cyclical' as Stevens suggests they are.48
If these reforms in American legal education are not, in fact, cyclical-a
replication of earlier attempts at integration of law and the liberal
arts-but rather represent a new turn, a new approach to the teaching of
law, how do the two movements of Critical Legal Studies and Law and
Economics play a role in curricular reform?
A. Law and Economics: Future Dominance Assured?
Obviously an infusion of the social sciences and the humanities into the
law school curriculum undermines the old concept of law as science or law
as an autonomous discipline. Judge Posner's article, The Decline of Law as
an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,"' picks up the thread which Stevens
left hanging-that is, Steven's failure to identify the common thread running throughout the recent decades of legal education. Posner sees the
"boom in disciplines that are complementary to law, particularly economics
and philosophy, '4 5 as contributing to the decline of law as an autonomous
discipline. Of the Economics Movement he tells us:
Economics not only has become more rigorous since the 1950s,
but it has branched out from market to non-market behavior,
thus taking in the subject matter of most interest to legal thinkers. It has also become more empirical. Not only is there today a
well-developed economic theory of crime, but economists have
measured the effects of punishment on the crime rate more rigorously than other social scientists, or lawyers, have ever done.
There is an economics of accidents and accident law, of the family and family law, of property rights and property law, of finance and corporations, even of free speech and the first amendment, and 46so on through almost the whole law school
curriculum.
Posner also makes important claims for the infusion of economics in the law
school curriculum:
In several important fields-antitrust, commercial law (including bankruptcy), corporations and securities regulation, regulated industries, and taxation-the economic perspective either
is already dominant or will soon be, when the older professors
and practitioners retire. In other important fields, such as torts,
property law, environmental law, and labor law, the economic
43.
44.

Id. at 604-05.
Posner, supra note 11.

45. Id. at 767.
46. Id:
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approach is making rapid strides. In still others, such as criminal
law and family law, the traditionalists
retain the upper
4
hand-but for how long, who can say? 7
Here, once again, is the question raised earlier by Stevens: "Was the law
school essentially a professional school or was it instead an academic area
of the university? Or was it both?" 48 Even if that dilemma was ever settled
temporarily,
there is no longer a consensus as to what a legal education
should consist of. For many, if not most students, law school
entails learning "black letter law" and "how-to-do-it" skills. In
this form, it is an intellectually narrowing rather than broadening experience. It can do little more than equip law students to
pass a bar examination and provide legal services of the most
rudimentary nature. It most certainly does not introduce them
to the theory and craft of lawyering or train them to be "artists
49
of the law."
According to Posner, law school has already reached new academic heights
with economics dominating American legal education, and the status quo is
more than threatened-it is destined for extinction: To Posner the question
is not if but when.
The data received in response to the questionnaires regarding liberal
arts courses in the law school curriculum supports Posner's sweeping claims
for Law and Economics. Most schools reported that they offer at least one
economics course and others listed eight, nine, ten, eleven, or even twelve,such courses. So it does appear that economics has become safely entrenched in the law school curriculum, but the continuing debate about curricular reform questions the dominance of law and economics as well as the
role of other social sciences:
Proposals for expanding the role of social sciences illustrate
the varying degrees of change that are being urged. Most good
law schools have added faculty who are trained in one of the
social sciences and who teach in the basic curriculum ...
Most people who have thought about the law school curriculum would agree with the general notion that more needs to be
done to accommodate the learning of the social sciences. How
47. Id. at 767-68.
48. Stevens, supra note 10, at 135.
49. Martineau, Legal Education and Training Artists of the Law, 57 N.Y.U.L. REV.
346, 351 (1982) (reviewing S. MENTSCHIKOFF AND I. STOTZKY, THE THEORY AND CRAFr OF
AMERICAN LAW (1981)).
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the accommodation is to be made is another matter, however. 50
There is a proposal to "reorient the entire first-year curriculum around a
law and economics perspective, with additional offerings that would explain,
respectively, empirical methodology and the influence of culture on law." 5'
There is a suggestion that the "law school should become a mini-university
within the university and be structured around a number of small graduate
divisions, each representing one of the social sciences." 52 There is a push for
"greater integration of the social science perspective . . . on much milder
53
terms."
To reformers the question is not if but how and to what extent the
social sciences should influence law school education. Whatever the result,
Law and Economics, in all likelihood, will have the dominant voice. "Some
fields that once seemed to promise important application to law, such as
psychology, linguistics, and sociology, have not made much recent progress
toward improving our understanding of law."'" Yet, lest we put too much
trust in the voice of the guru of economics regarding the relevant role of his
own discipline and that of other social sciences, we should turn to at least
one other voice. Byse recounts the emergence of economic theory in the law
school curriculum:
In the 1930s and 1940s the function of economics in the
law school curriculum was, in the main, limited to a subsidiary
role in the courses in antitrust and public utilities. Today economic analysis is employed in teaching many other subjects including such staples as torts, contracts . . . .Many law schools
have appointed economists . .

.

.Courses on law and economics

are offered. Textbooks have been published. "A new age of faith
appeared to be dawning." Other social scientists such as psychiatrists, sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, and histori50.
51.

Weistart, supra note 10, at 326.
Id. at 326.

52. Id. at 327.
53. Id.
54. Posner, supra note 11, at 769. Linguistics is becoming extremely important as the
Law and Literature Movement turns to the use of literary criticism to examine legal texts. The
Law and Psychology survey resulted in a body of data which did not reflect an actual "movement," but there is a movement known as the Law and Society Movement which
is based on the application of sociological concepts and theories to legal institutions. It
tends to emphasize-as does the law and economics movement, in a different
way-empirical research into how the law 'really' operates. . . .Its members are politically left of center, but there is considerable variety among them. The movement is
strong at Wisconsin law school, and has notable representatives here and there. It is
essentially unrepresented at Harvard.
Professor Clark speaking at The Harvard Club in New York City on May 13, 1985. See infra
note 57, at 3.
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ans have been appointed to faculties and, as I have suggested,
more and more recent appointees to law faculties have advanced
degrees in nonlaw [sic] subject matters. As a result, many "Law
and

_"

courses are offered. But, in my opinion,

none of these, except possibly history and philosophy,
equals ec55
onomics in terms of its impact on legal education.
We see, therefore, that Posner is not alone in his view that economics has
become the predominant force among the social sciences upon legal
education.
B. Critical Legal Studies: Pervasive Iconoclasts?
If Judge Posner rallies the cause for Law and Economics, he is less
optimistic for the Critical Legal Studies Movement:
Developments in Continental philosophy and in literary theory
(for present purposes best regarded as a specialized branch of
epistemology) have exposed a deep vein of profound skepticism
about the possibility of authoritative interpretation of texts. This
skepticism has fueled, along with political radicalism and sheer
infantilism, the contemporary movement in legal scholarship
known as "critical legal studies." The combined impact of radicalism and philosophy on constitutional law scholarship has been
especially dramatic, some might say disastrous. Lacking real intellectual autonomy, law may be too open to incursions from
58
other fields of thought.
What "incursion" into law has the Critical Legal Studies Movement
(CLSM) made? And has that incursion been "disastrous"?
Perhaps the best way to attempt to characterize Critical Legal Studies
is simply to list the words and phrases most frequently used to describe the
movement: It is said to be critical, political, radical, skeptical, liberal, infantile, revolutionary, left-wing, utopian, Marxist, iconoclastic, nihilistic; CLS
scholars trash, deconstruct, and destroy legal texts; the movement is antipathetic to science, technology, business, commerce, large organizations, formal organizations, capitalism, conventional law practice, the legal profession, and traditional legal scholarship. 57 The movement thus described is
55. Byse, supra note 10, at 1078-79. For an early look at the relationship of anthropology, economics, sociology, psychology, and political theory to law. See H. CAIRNS, LAW AND
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1969).
56. Posner, supra note 11, at 768.
57. Comments of Professor Clark, HarvardSociety For Law and Public Policy and
The Federalist Society (May 13, 1985) (A Discussion on Critical Legal Studies at the
Harvard Law School).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 2

278

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

said to be either an extension of the Legal Realism Movemeht of the 1920s
and 1930s5 8 or the brain child of a bunch of disgruntled hippies left over
from the 1960s.59 Professor Kennedy60 pinpoints the origins of the movement and addresses the disagreement about its beginnings by explaining
that CLS really has two branches: a movement branch and a scholarly
branch. On the one hand, the movement has been described as follows:
The movement strand of Critical Legal Studies is something like this. It's a national movement. All over the United
States, there are young or middle-aged and a relatively few
older law professors who think of themselves as in some sense
part of the Critical Legal Studies movement. On that level, it is
basically a network for people who are political radicals who are
teaching in law schools, who tend to feel, as political radicals,
extremely isolated, and they tend to feel that they are a persecuted minority in their institutions, or at best that they are marginal. And the Critical Legal Studies movement is a way to create a kind of political identity ....
So, on that level, the movement is really without ideological
definition at all. It's really a rag-tag band of left over 60s people
and young people with nostalgia for the great events of 15 years
ago. That's the movement dimension."1
On the other hand, the scholarly dimension "is best understood as an extension and development of American Legal Realism. Very much in the specific tradition of the more left-wing Legal Realist writing of the 1920s and
1930s. ' ' 62
The most frequent criticism leveled against the CLSM is that its dismal view of the law is not coupled with any attempt to offer a workable
alternative and solution. "[I]ts prescriptive faith in our human capacity to
create new and better societies when freed from the disempowering mystification of our present system seems to many to be naive, vague, or illformed. .

.

.C.L.S. itself has never persuasively incorporated into its vision

for the future the lessons it has exposed from our past." 63 As Fiss concludes: "[c]ritique without a vision of what might replace that which is
58. But see Id. at 3 for Professor Clark's statement that the Law and Society Movement is "the true heir to the legal realism of the 1930s and 1940s."
59. See Husson, Expandingthe Legal Vocabulary: The Challenge Posed by the Deconstruction and Defense of Law, 95 YALE L.J. 969, 969 n.2 (1986).

60. Supra note 57 (Comments of Professor Kennedy).
61. Id. at 8-9.
62. Id. at 9.
63. Husson, supra note 59, at 970.
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destroyed . . . [is] politically unappealing and politically irresponsible";"
and the theorists have "yet to work out the details of their brave new
world."65
Admitting to the unpromising antecedents of the CLSM, Roberto
Mangabeira Unger notes two overriding and important concerns of the tradition: First, "the critique of formalism and objectivity.
. , in this context
a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possibility of, a
method of legal justification that contrasts with open-ended disputes about
the basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, or visionary;" 66 Second, "the purely instrumental use of legal
practice and legal doctrine to advance leftist aims . .
Even if Unger
does not directly challenge the claim that the CLSM offers no reconstruction to their own deconstruction, he does at least propose an aim for the
movement: "The constructive outcome of our critique of objectivism is to
turn us toward the search for alternative institutional forms of the available
institutional ideals, most especially the market and the democracy." ' S The
CLSM aims "for the reconstruction of the state and the rest of the largescale institutional structures of society." 69 Acknowledging the criticism of
and resistance to the CLSM, Unger, in a piece of dazzling prose elevated to
the level of literature, states:
",16

The legal academy that we entered dallied in one more variant of the perennial effort to restate power and preconception
as right. In and outside the law schools, most jurists looked with
indifference and even disdain upon legal theorists who, like the
rights and principles of the law and economics schools, have volunteered to salvage and recreate the traditions of objectivism
and formalism ....
When we came, they were like a priesthood that had lost
faith and kept their jobs. They stood in tedious embarrassment
before cold altars. But we turned away from those altars and
found the mind's opportunity in the heart's revenge.70
Even the grand literary style of Unger, however, has proven to be less
persuasive than the CLSM would have desired. At Harvard, where
"[CLSM] members eschew collaboration with the conventional economists
64.
65.

Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1986).
See supra note 57, at 4-5 (Comments of Professor Clark).

66. R.

UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 1

67.
68.
69.
70.

at
at
at
at

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

4.
22.
25.
119.
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and sociologists of American universities," ' and where the CLSM has
made its greatest mark, it is said that "[t]he main impact has been prolonged, intense, bitter conflict among different groups of faculty members"72 caused primarily by "a ritual slaying of the elders"73 and the criti74
calists' acquisition of power by voting en bloc on appointments matters.
The question which the "Discussion on Critical Legal Studies at the
Harvard Law School" attempted to answer was "[w]hether the extent of
the movement's influence has damaged the intellectual quality of the law
school (as its critics claim) or provided invigorating radical dissent (as its
proponents suggest) . . .
In his opening presentation at the Harvard forum on CLS, Professor
Clark outlines five claims of the CLSM which he, in turn, refutes. Those
claims are:
1. Wrongful legitimation. Legal doctrine is often aimed at
legitimating structures of power and distributions of wealth that
are unjust and illegitimate. The same point is made about lawrelated talk and writing of all sorts: rules, judicial opinions, law
review articles, treatises, etc ...
2. Incoherence and contradiction. When the texts of legal
writers are examined closely and critically, they can be exposed
as being full of contradictions and deep-level incoherencies
3. Indeterminacy.Legal arguments are generally indeterminate. For each conclusion you can develop an equally plausible
argument for the opposite conclusion, often by appealing to the
same values or ideals as the first argument ....
4. Illusions of Necessity. Explanations of legal rules and
practices, especially those that purport to use general scientific
methods and theories (like those of economics), are often mere
attempts to create an illusion of necessity, in order to lull people
into accepting the status quo and adopting a defeatist attitude
toward the possibility of radical change .

...

5. Criticism and Liberation. If you work to uncover and
identify the deep structure and the most basic underlying assumptions behind the legal reasoning of others and eventually of
71.

Supra note 57, at 3 (Comments of Professor Clark).

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Supra note 57.
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yourself, and if you succeed in achieving this level of critical
insight, you will be set free-to
choose new and better assump7
tions and thought patterns.
The above aspects of the CLSM, outlined and refuted by Professor Clark,
are included for their usefulness in understanding what the CLSM is all
about.77 No utility exists in elaborating on Professor Clark's refutation of
these claims, nor in discussing in detail the subsequent arguments presented
at the Harvard meeting. However, a few statements by some of the participants in the forum illustrate considerable disagreement over the impact of
the CLSM at, and upon, Harvard.
On the one hand Professors Kennedy and Bator believe that the
CLSM has had a negative influence on the intellectual climate at Harvard.
Professor Kennedy: "It's a generational battle; it's a cultural-style battle;
it's a battle about scholarly paradigms.178 Professor Bator: "In the early
years of CLS presence at the Harvard Law school, the impact of CLS was
enriching and strengthening . .

.

.It is all the more dismaying, therefore,

to have to say that, since those early days, this promising beginning has
failed to bear fruit. Since the late 70s, it is my sad opinion that CLS has
had an absolutely disastrous effect on the intellectual and institutional life
of Harvard Law School. ' 9
On the other hand, Professor Chayes views the CLSM as a positive
influence on the intellectual climate at Harvard. Professor Chayes: "I don't
think the Harvard Law School is the scene of a sectarian battle between
two camps, one under the banner of CLS, and the other under some equally
far out conservative banner. Today, I think that Harvard Law School is a
richer, more diverse, more vibrant. . . innovative place, than it has been in
40 years." 80 "Suffice it to say, that the CLSM which has made an incursion
into law is highly controversial with some people subscribing to Judge Posner's "disaster" hypothesis while others believe that "a group of brilliant
and radical, if you want to put it that way, people came in and put us on
our mettle, forced us to re-examine assumptions, ideas, premises that we
had long taken for granted, forced us to rethink our own positions and our
own teaching and writing. And that has been a most healthy experience.' "81 Until all the foregoing controversy is resolved, the place of CLS
in the law school curriculum cannot be evaluated adequately.
76.

Supra note 57, at 5-6 (Comments of Professor Clark).

77. For an introduction to Critical Legal Studies see also THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982); CriticalLegal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1984).

78.
79.
80.
81.

Supra note 57, at 11 (Comments of Professor Kennedy).
Supra note 57, at 13 (Comments of Professor Bator).
Supra note 57, at 16 (Comments of Professor Chayes).
Id.
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The data collected on the role of the liberal arts in the law school curriculum sheds some light on the extent to which CLS are being taught at
various institutions, but even this data tends to blur the distinctions between
CLS as a political force, or movement, and CLS as a scholarly endeavor.
No real agreement exists between the various law schools as to what should
be included under the CLS rubric. Of the seventy-six schools which responded to the survey, thirteen listed courses under CLS. The titles are
diverse: Legal Realism Seminar, Seminar in Post Realist Legal Theory,
Critical Legal Studies Seminar, Law and Marxism, and Contemporary Legal Theory. One school included "Comparative Law" under CLS while
other schools included comparative law under Political Science or general
Philosophy. The University of Cincinnati included The First Amendment
and The U.S. Supreme Court under CLS while other schools excluded
those subjects from the CLS category. Wisconsin listed three coursesFeminist Legal Theory Seminar, Social Theory, and Law and Welfare
State Seminar-under a CLS rubric.
Harvard's courses were taken from the catalogue and these perhaps
best illustrate the difficulty in attempting to determine where and to what
extent CLS has pervaded the curriculum in both content and philosophy.
Comparative law in all its variations is classified as political science. Constitutional law courses are highly susceptible to CLS orientation, as are the
many titles listed under sociology, jurisprudence, and general philosophy.
What this data tells us is that CLS is out there. What the data does not tell
us is to what extent!
C. Law and Literature: Gaining Ground in the Confrontation with the
Law and Economics and the CLS Movements?
As the Law and Economics Movement and the CLSM vie for dominance in the law school curriculum, yet another "movement" is gaining
ground-that movement, of course, is the Law and Literature Movement.
The critical aspect of the Law and Literature movement is seen as a reaction and response to both the Law and Economics Movement and the Critical Legal Studies Movement. Professor Hegland 8 responds to the deconstruction of CLS in his article entitled "Goodbye to Deconstruction." 8 3
Professor Giradeau Spann has recently put forth, and defended
with great vigor, what appears to be a central tenet of the muchdiscussed Critical Legal Studies Movement: all legal rules and
doctrines are indeterminate-they don't, and can't, decide legal
controversies, even the simple ones. The process of demonstrat82.

Professor Hegland was one of the early advocates of teaching law and literature.

See Appendix II, University of Arizona.
83. Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203 (1985).
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ing this Spann calls "deconstruction. ' '84
Hegland maintains that Spann suggests that "[p]rincipled legal decisionmaking is a sham, disguising the subjective preference of the judge."8
Hegland continues: "This is not chopped liver; this is a frontal attack on the
rule of Law itself." 86 "Let us assume, however, that he [Spann] correctly
asserts the deconstructionist thesis. Thanks to his clarity, the dragon, to use
Holmes' metaphor, is out of its cave; we can count its teeth and claws, and
discover its strength. '87 Playing Perseus to Andromeda, the critical branch
of the law and literature movement attempts to slay two dragons-as
Hegland suggests, the "dragon" exposed by CLS that all legal rules and
doctrines are indeterminate-and the dragon which is CLS itself.
The members of the critical branch of the law and literature movement
attempt to do what the CLS scholars have avoided: acknowledge and climb
the mountain. "Articulate deconstructionists, instead of blithely denying the
existence of the mountain with tiresome epistemology, might better devote
their obvious talents to making it more habitable." 88 To put it simply: "One
hundred years ago, lawyers talked about law as if it were a neutral and
objective framework for solving people's disputes"8 9 but "[n]o lawyer quite
believes that anymore."90

On the one hand, we have the lawyers who side with CLS scholars and
who "prefer the dangers involved in presenting law in terms of its controversial, political, creative nature to the dangers involved in its idealization." 91 On the other hand, we have those who are
still trying to save as much of the ideal as possible. Many lawyers currently interested in literary theory are borrowing ideas
from this discipline in an attempt to salvage some degree of certainty, predictability, and objectivity in law. They realize that
law is man-made and that any legal interpretation is to some
extent subjective. But they prefer to rely on those literary theorists-such as.E.D. Hirsch Jr., the author of "Validity in Interpretation"; Wayne C. Booth, author of "Critical Understanding:
The Powers and Limits of Pluralism"; and the New Critic Cleanth Brooks-who emphasize the limits and restraints on interpretation rather than those-among them Barbara Johnson at
84. Id. at 1203.
85. Id. at 1204.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88 Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1221 (1985).
89. Frug, Henry James, Lee Marvin and the Law, N.Y. Times Book Review, Feb. 16,
1986, at 1, col. 1.
90. Id. at 28, col. 1.
91. Id. at 29, col. 3.
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Harvard; Paul de Man, at the time of his death in 1983 a professor at Yale University; and the French philosopher-critics
Jacques Derrida, Michel
Foucault and Roland Barthes-who
92
emphasize its openness.

But if law and literary theorists are reacting to the nihilism of critical legal
theory scholars, so are those who are "turning to economics to accomplish
the same purpose [as Law and Literature critics], in the belief that economic science can provide a stable basis for legal decisions . .

,"" There

are those, however, who would level criticism at both the CLSM and the
Law and Economics Movement claiming that although "the jurisprudential
movements of the seventies have electrified the academy, they also distort
the purposes of law and threaten its very existence."' With reform in
mind, Fiss sums up the frustration with and criticism of these two
movements:
Of course, law will exist even if the two jurisprudential movements of which I have spoken are victorious, in the limited sense
that there will be people who wear black robes and decide cases,
but it will be a very different kind of law. For (Judge) Kennedy,
adjudication will be entirely particularistic; for Judge Posner it
will be wholly instrumental. In neither case will it be capable of
sustaining or generating a public morality. It will be law without
inspiration.9 5
To succumb to Law and Economics or CLS, would "mean the death of the
law, as we have known it throughout history, and as we have come to admire it." 6
IV.

THE

Two

BRANCHES OF THE LAW AND LITERATURE MOVEMENT

A. The Fiction and the Law Branch: The Intrinsic Worth of Literary Values in a Legal Education
Shortly, we shall turn to the law and literary theorists who are trying
to bring back "certainty, predictability, and objectivity in the law"' 7 by applying literary methods of critical analysis to legal texts such as the constitution, statutes, and common law cases. However, consideration will first be
given to the beginnings of the earliest branch of the Law and Literature
Movement-the branch which deals with fiction and the law.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 28, col. 1.
Id.
Fiss, supra note 64, at 1.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Frug, supra note 89, at 28.
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In the beginning there was a simple list of "legal" novels put together
by Wigmore and published in 1908.9 8 To Wigmore, a "legal" novel was
simply "a novel in which a lawyer, most of all, ought to be interested."' 9
Those legal novels were of four kinds:
(A) Novels in which some trial scene is described-perhaps
including a skillful cross-examination;
(B) Novels in which the typical traits of a lawyer or judge,
or the ways of professional life, are portrayed;
(C) Novels in which the methods of law in the detection,
pursuit, and punishment of crime are delineated; and
(D) Novels in which some point of law, affecting the rights
or the conduct of the personages, enters into the plot.100
Wigmore thought that the lawyer had a "general duty as a cultivated man
[, and] because of his special professional duty[,] to be familiar with
those features of his profession which have been taken up into general
thought and literature."'' 01 But even more importantly, "the lawyer must
know human nature. He must deal understandingly with its types, its motives .

. .

. For this learning, then, he must go to fiction, which is the gal-

lery of life's portraits."'10 2 Wigmore's list was later corrected and reprinted
in 1922 under the title of "A list of One Hundred Legal Novels."' 03

Although Wigmore saw the reading of legal novels as a duty of the
practicing attorney, a divorce existed between the lawyer's professional
training in law school and his pursuit of literature. Chekhov, in speaking of
his relationship to literature and medicine makes an apt analogy:
I feel more contented when I remember that I have two professions, and not one. Medicine [Law] is my lawful wife and literature my mistress. When I am bored with one I spend the night
with the other. Though this is irregular, it is not monotonous,
and besides neither loses anything through my infidelity. 0 4
98. Wigmore, supra note 9.
99. Id. at 574.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 576.
102. Id. at 579.
103. Wigmore, A List of One Hundred Legal Novels, 17 ILL. L. REV. 26 (1922).
104. Letter from Anton Pavlovich Chekhov to Alexei Suvorin (Sept. 11, 1898). This is
the better known translation cited in Bartlett's FamiliarQuotations (according to that source
the letter was dated August 29, 1898). But see letters of Anton Chekhov 107 (M. H. Hein
trans. 1973) for the following translation:
I feel more alert and more satisfied with myself when I think of myself as having two
occupations instead of one. Medicine is my lawful wedded wife, and literature my mis-
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But in an early attempt to unite literature and law in the law school classroom, Professor Davenport gave an experimental course in legal literature
at the University of Southern California in 1954. The purposes and goals of
the course were as follows:
[The course was taught] with the practical purpose of teaching
them [the students] legal terminology, trial procedure, some
knowledge of human relations, various ways of interpreting a
single action, the various kinds of truth, etc., and the contingent,
equally valid, purpose of providing training in reading comprehension, oral and written expression, knowledge of types and
forms of literature, and methods of deriving real pleasure from
good reading.105
The course was, apparently, only "moderately successful,"' 06 but when
Time featured the course in an article under Education, 07 Davenport found
himself deluged with letters from judges, lawyers, and school administrators
from all over the United States-as well as from parties from seven foreign
countries-requesting his reading list. 08
Those requests led to the publication of "A Bibliography: Readings in
Legal Literature."' 1 9 A glimpse at the titles under the heading of "Bibliographies and Lists of Readings" 110 shows the flurry of activity that has taken
place since the 1908 publication of Wigmore's list: "Law in Literature"-(1935);"' "What Do the Justices Read?"--(1949); 112 "What Lawyers Read"--(1950);" 3 and "Literature for Lawyers"--(1954).1

4

How-

ever, the preoccupation with Wigmore's list did not cease. Wigmore's list
was "revisited" by Weisberg in 1976"1 and "expanded" by Weisberg and
Kretschman in 1978.116 Lists continue to be generated, but now the majortress. When one gets on my nerves, I spend the night with the other. This may be somewhat disorganized, but then again it's not as boring, and anyway, neither one loses anything by my duplicity.
105. Davenport, A Bibliography: Readings in Legal Literature, 41 A.B.A. J. 939
(1955).
106. Id.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Davenport, supra note 105.
110. Id. at 940.
111. Finlay, Law in Literature, 175 L.T. 364 (1935), cited in Davenport, supra note
105, at 940.
112. Armstrong, What Do the Justices Read?, 35 A.B.A. J.295 (1949).
113. Blaustein, What Lawyers Read, 19 J.B.A. KANS.236 (1951); 22 N.Y. ST. B. BULL.

322 (1950).
114. Davenport, Literaturefor Lawyers, 29 CAL. ST. B. J.115 (1954).
115. Weisberg, Wigmore's "Legal Novels" Revisited: New Resourcesfor the Expansive
Lawyer, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 17 (1976).
116. Weisberg and Kretschman, Wigmore's "Legal Novels" Expanded: A Collaborative
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ity of the new lists are thematically organized, stressing topics such as "Legal Humor"11 7 or "Criminals in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century American Law and Literature."1 1 8
As interest in the compilation of lists of "legal" works has persisted,119
so has the interest of law schools in offering courses in Law and Literature:
"founded as a clandestine seminar. . .[Law and Literature is] now out in
the open and thriving. 120 Appendix I demonstrates that of the one hundred
and thirty-five schools which responded to the Law and Literature survey,
thirty-eight offer or have offered such a course. Law and Literature courses
are usually taught as a seminar with a limited enrollment of between
twenty and twenty-five, although there are reports of numbers as low as five
and as high as forty. Such courses are usually offered yearly, but some
schools report offering them infrequently, perhaps occasionally, or every
two years. Several schools report offering them in 1988 for the first time.
As these schools come to grips with dealing with a justification for such
courses, we are back, once again, to Stevens' question regarding the role of
law school as a professional or an academic pursuit.
If I might resort to anecdote for a moment, I think it will underscore
the attitude which is prevelant among "trade school" attorneys-the attitude which resists, at least temporarily, the infusion of the humanities into
the law school curriculum.
There were four of us at dinner that night, my attorney husband, our
friend-also an attorney-his wife, and myself. The conversation turned,
first of all, to an ethical question: the question of turning in evidence given
to an attorney by someone other than his client. Then my husband mentioned my work on the topic of Law and Literature. "Law and Literature!"
our friend exclaimed. "What has that got to do with practicing law? When
you get out in the real world and have five real estate closings in a day, how
will you have time for law and literature then?" And so I began justifying a
course of that title, explaining that it wasn't a "suspect class"; but I wasn't
sure that he was convinced.
The following week I received in the mail an article published in The
Effort, 50 N.Y. ST. B.J. 123 (1978).
117. Bander, Legal Humor Dissected, 75 LAW LIAR. J. 289 (1982); Bander, A Survey
of Legal Humor Books, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1065 (1985).
118. Morse and Bourguignon, supra note 14.
119. See DEAN'S LIST OF RECOMMENDED READINGS FOR PRE-LAW AND LAW STUDENTS
(J. Marke & E. Bander eds. 1958); A New List of Recommended Reading for Prospective
Law Students, 83 MICH. L. REV. 663 (1985). See also Suretsky, Search for a Theory: An
Annotated Bibliography of Writings on the Relation of Law to Literature and the Humanities, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 727 (1979).
120. Appendix I, Associate Dean and Professor of Law Kenney Hegland, The University of Arizona College of Law.
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National Law Journaldealing with an ethics question. The piece was entitled "A Legal Duty to Turn Over the Evidence?"'1

21

With the article was

the following note from our friend: "Liz: This would make an excellent
ethics question on the bar exam. I turned over the gun to the police in
exchange for a promise by them that the source (me!) would not be divulged. Sorry I have no sample possible questions for the bar exam in Law
and Literature."
So he wasn't convinced. The bar exam was everything; The humanities
were insignificant. But a week later he stopped by and gave me another
article from The National Law Journal; this time the article was entitled:
"Literature And the Law: A Perfect Fit."'1 2 2 "It's funny," he said. "I had

never heard of such a thing until last week and here it is. It's like having a
disease-you never hear of it until you have it yourself."
Without succumbing to the "disease" metaphor-unless it is to stress
the infectious nature of Law and Literature courses, that is by way of
"spreading"-we come to the place where justification is once again required for the inclusion of Law and Literature courses in the law school
curriculum. Law and Literature needs to be shown to be an unnecessarily
suspect class,' 23 and no better place can be turned to than Robert Ferguson's Law and Letters in American Culture 24 in order to confirm the first
proposition that "[t]o be an eminent barrister, a man must be 'a scholar
and gentleman' . . . . The members of the bar form one of the most brilliant sections of society; and he who would be of it must be fit for it.' 2 5

In reviewing Ferguson's book, Page 26 informs us that "between 1765
and 1840, law and literature were fused both professionally and intellectually. Joseph Story in 1829 expressed the era's dominant view when he
stated that the study of law required 'a full possession of the general litera121. Dubin, A Legal Duty to Turn Over the Evidence, THE NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1988,
at 13, col.3.
122. Chambers, LiteratureAnd the Law: A Perfect Fit,THE NAT'L L.J., July 25, 1988,
at 13, col.3.
123. But see LaRue, Posner on Literature, 85 MICH. L. REV. 325, 328 (1986) (for the
notion that "the genre is suspect").
124. FERGUSON, supra note 15. For a further look at the early union and later divorce of
men of letters and men of law see Smith, Law as Form and Theme in American Letters: An

Essay in Law and American Literature, in LAW AND AMERICAN LITERATURE: A COLLECTION
OF ESSAYS (1983).
125. JACK'S REFERENCE BOOK 750 (1910), cited in Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective,
1983 Wisc. L. REV. 639.
126. Page, The Place of Law and Literature, 39 VAND. L. REV. 391 (1986) (reviewing

R.

FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE

(1984); R.

WEISBERG, THE FAIL-

URE OF THE WORD: THE LAWYER AS PROTAGONIST IN MODERN FICTION

(1984); J.

WHITE,

WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE,
CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY
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ture of ancient and modern times.' "127 During that period " [m]ost prominent writers and critics were lawyers who viewed the law as their primary
occupation; the professional writer or scholar was virtually unknown."1 8
Lawyers at that time "were well educated in literature, especially in the
Greek and Roman classics."129 As Ferguson states:
Half of the important critics of the day trained for law, and
attorneys controlled many of the important journals. Belles lettres societies furnished the major basis of cultural concern for
post-Revolutionary America; they depended heavily on the legal
profession for their memberships. Lawyers also wrote many of
the country's first important novels, plays, and poems.130
But by the Civil War, "the configuration of law and literature had collapsed" due to "the rise of legal specialization . ..[,]the democratization
of the bar by the influx of lawyers without classical education ... [J"11"1'
and the increasing faith in positive law. "However dedicated the young student might be to letters, the professional 'man of letters' was expected to
give his best energies to his profession and to scribble any purely literary
works only as his leisure permitted. 113 2 With the ultimate collapse of this
configuration of law and letters "[t]he lawyer's deliberate combination of
gave way to
intellectual breadth, artistic insight and political commitment"
3
"the stark separation of intellect, art and politics.'
Ferguson, like Stevens, leaves the reader without taking into account
recent developments in education, notably the inclusion of the social sciences, the introduction of philosophy-particularly CLS-and the latest addition to a multidisciplinary approach to legal education-the Law and
Literature Movement. As Page notes, these "scholars [have] manifested a
renewed faith in the interdependence of law and general knowledge.'' 4 In
bringing back the humanities as well as the social sciences, we will produce
lawyers "whose minds have been opened to the rich experience of western
civilization; whose spirits have been enlarged by exposure to philosophy, art,
music, literature, and drama; and whose horizons have been widened by the
study of the natural and social sciences. Unless a lawyer has contemplated
the enigma of the human condition, he or she will be a technician perhaps,
127. Id. at 394.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. FERGUSON, supra note 15, at 5.

supra note

at 399.

131.

PAGE,

132.

Brooks, Book Review, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1047, 1048 (1986) (reviewing
LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984)).

LAW AND

126,

supra note 15, at 9-10.
supra note 126, at 402.

133.

FERGUSON,

134.

PAGE,
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The ultimate justification, then, for the inclusion of a course in Law
and Literature in the law school curriculum is to bring back the lost configuration of law and letters. In order to do that it is necessary to subscribe to
the notion that the most effective way to achieve that end is to view law
school both as an academic and as a professional pursuit. If we answer
Stevens' question thus and begin with that premise, then at least four valid
reasons for the teaching of the traditional Law and Literature course can be
proffered and supported:
1. Reading works of literature-especially the classics-will expose
students to elements of style generally lacking in poorly written legal decisions and law school text books-the former often created by overworked
law clerks and the latter hurriedly prepared to meet marketing deadlines.
Axelrod writes a witty and entertaining piece entitled Law and the Humanities: Notes from the Underground3 6 in which the protagonist claims that
all the humanities have to offer the study of law is style and the author
3 7
concludes that style "may be all there is.'
Some law schools endeavor to expose students to style, not through
fiction, but by the reading of literary legal materials. For example, Indiana
University's course Literature and Law "emphasizes the literary features of
rules, statutes, appellate opinions and jurisprudential writers," 13 8 but it goes
further than style in "[h]ighlighting the personae, mimesis, narrative and
interpretive meaning of the law . . . ."13 And like Indiana University's
Literature and Law course, and courses designated as Literature in Law,
courses entitled "The Legal Imagination"' 4 - - which do utilize fiction and
which are based on White's book of the same name'-are also difficult to
place in the Law and Literature Movement. The course entitled "The Legal
Imagination"--offered at Tennessee University-is taught with the objective of "exploring the potential and limitation of langauge." ' l But, of his
course, also entitled "The Legal Imagination," Professor Ayer at the University of California/Davis says: "For theoretical reasons that are somewhat tedious to explain, I don't like to call this a 'law and lit' course. Nev135. Freedman, The Law as Educator, 70 IowA L. Rav. 487, 490 (1985).
136. Axelrod, supra note 3.
137. Id. at 236.
138. Indiana University, Appendix I. The opinions referred to are usually those of Cardozo, see supra note 2. See also Papke, Neo-Marxists. Neitzcheans, and New Critics: The
Voices of the Contemporary Law and Literary Discourse, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 883,

884-85.
I.

139.
140.

Indiana University, supra note 138.
See The University of California/Davis and the University of Tennessee, Appendix

141.
142.

White, supra note 3.
The University of Tennessee, Appendix I.
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ertheless I recognize that many other people do, and will continue to do
3
' 14

so."

Professor Papke244 deals with the placement of The Legal Imagination
in the Law and Literature movement and states in pertinent part:
The central theme in this book is the suggestion that creativity
and imagination need not be abandoned when one writes in and
about the law. Like Wigmore and Cardozo earlier in the century, White is concerned that legal practitioners are becoming
mechanical in their use of langauge and thinking, two processes
that White sees as inseparable. The Legal145Imagination is
White's antidote for this professional malady.
With their emphasis on language and style-both in the judicial opinion and fiction-Cardozo, Wigmore, and White are being joined by none
other than Judge Posner who is crossing the barrier from the social sciences
into the humanities, specifically into the field of Law and Literature. 48
LaRue, himself suspicious of the Law and Literature genre,14' informs us
that Posner's view of literature is that "[i]f we wish to learn about style, we
need to turn to the place where style is most magnificently demonstrated,
that is, to literature."'' 48 Aided by the work of literary critics, "we can study
what judges do, and with our increased sophistication in matters of style,
we can see better how they [the judges] go about doing it, that is, how they
go about persuading us. Alternatively, we can improve our own style, and
49
thus be more able performers.'
2. By a careful study of literature we can become better critical readers. Literature offers us a "way of reading, and reading not only 'literature'
but all kinds of texts and expressions .... "110 What "literature has to
teach us" is not "reducible [only] to 'style.' "'I" To White, law is "an art

essentially literary and rhetorical in nature, a way of establishing meaning
and constituting community in language.' 52 Language for White is the ultimate persuader, and he tells us that "[w]hoever controls our language has
the greatest power of all."' 5 3 To exercise that control one must be both a
143.
144.

Professor Ayer, The University of California/Davis, Appendix I.
Papke, supra note 138.

145. Id. at 892.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REv. 1351 (1986).
LaRue, supra note 123.
Id. at 328.
Id.
150. White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto", 39 MERCER L. REV. 739, 745

(1988).
151. Id. at 747.
152.

J. WHITE, supra note 126, at xi.

153. White, supra note 150, at 747.
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careful reader and a master of style.
3. With the loss of a continued faith in the absolute truth once thought
to be inherent in legal texts, exposure to the classics will prepare lawyers
and judges for the contemplation of the human condition-a contemplation
necessary if lawyers and judges are to be actively engaged in interpretation
of legal documents. As Judge Learned Hand reflected:
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called
upon to pass on a question of consitutional law, to have at least
a bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and
Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato,
Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with books which have been specifically written on the subject. For in such matters everything
turns upon the spirit in which he approaches the questions
before him. The words he must construe are empty vessels into
which he can pour nearly anything he will. Men do not gather
figs of thistles, nor supple institutions
from judges whose outlook
15
is limited by parish or class. 4
4. Law and Literature courses will strengthen the Humanities in the
law school curriculum and soften the effect of the social sciences, especially
the Law and Economics Movement. Robin West's comparison of "economic
man" with "literary woman" adeptly handles this topic. 15 "The 'literary
woman' posited by literary legal theorists is coming into her own, and she is
at least beginning to operate as a check on the excesses of economic man
run wild.

' 156

Unlike the economic man who "relentlessly chooses what he

prefers, prefers what he wants, wants what he desires, and desires what will
maximize his subjective well-being . . . [, and who is] perfectly ra-

tional,"' 57 literary woman allows us to "reach an empathic understanding-a grasping-of the subjectivity, the pain, the pleasure, the happiness,
or the sadness of the other."'' 58 By turning to literature "we can fulfill the
empathic promise of the literary person rather than the egoistic danger of
economic man."' 5 9 Ultimately, the "literary woman" offers something glaringly obvious "but the least mentioned in modern discourse of the law and
literature movement[:] Literature helps us understand others . . . . It
makes us more moral . . . .[Literary woman] is the possibility within all
154. Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1930).
155. West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV.
867 (1988).
156. Id. at 867.

157. Id. at 868-69.
158. Id. at 872.
159. Id. at 875.
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of us for understanding, for empathy, for sympathy, and most simply, for
0
love."

16

If Law and Literature courses which utilize fiction lead to the desired
end of once again bringing about the configuration of law and letters by
exposing students to grand literary style, by teaching the students to read a
text critically, by forcing the student to focus on man's ultimate condition,
and by bringing together in the student a balance of Romanticism and Rationalism-a balance between the head and the heart, a balance between
the Dionysian and the Apollonian forces-that alone is justification for the
inclusion of such courses in the law school curriculum, especially if we accept the premise that law school education should be both an academic and
a professional endeavor. What we see, however, is that texts being taught in
this area are selected with additional purposes in mind.
Turning to Appendix II, we see that most of the works on the fiction
list fall within the four categories outlined by Wigmore-works about trials, works dealing with a lawyer or judge as protagonist, works involving
crime and punishment, works dealing with an effect on rights and conduct. 161 The non-fiction titles include many philosophical works dealing
with jurisprudential issues. These works of fiction and non-fiction expose the
student to great works of literature while at the same time affording him an
opportunity to see himself and his future profession through the eyes of the
artists of the world. The student is also given an opportunity to see philosophical minds dealing with jurisprudential issues. Stressing this matter in
such courses "should alert students to the moral and ethical dimensions of
the law and in the process stimulate broader humanistic thinking and dialogue about legal concerns ....

"I'll As

Appendix I reflects, respondents to

the Law and Literature survey offer many other reasons and justifications
for a course in Law and Literature, all of them enticing and inviting, but let
us not forget Professor Burnett's objective in teaching the course: "Fun."' 6 3
B. The CriticalBranch: Applying Methods of Literary Criticism to Legal
Texts
It appears, then, that Law and Literature as it has been traditionally
taught-that is through courses utilizing fiction or through the rare course
in "Literature in Law" or "The Legal Imagination"-is alive and well, and
that it is flourishing and multiplying. But, as was mentioned earlier, the
Law and Literature Movement has two branches: a branch that deals with
160. WEsT, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contract, 39
867, 877-78 (1988).
161. Wigmore, supra note 9, at 574.
162. Indiana University, Appendix I.
163. Syracuse University, Appendix I.
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fiction, and a branch that applies theories of literary criticism to legal texts.
This latter branch is receiving the most attention in current law reviews,
and it is to that branch of the Law and Literature Movement that we now
turn.
The discussion of the Critical Legal Studies Movement began with a
catalogue of words frequently used to describe the movement. A discussion
of the critical strand of the Law and Literature Movement might best begin
with a catalogue of the names of some of the key figures in the field: Dworkin,'6 4 Fish, 6 5 Fiss, 166 Levinson,167 Posner,168 Weisberg,16 9 West,' 70 and
164. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986);
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Dworkin Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 527 (1982). For a review of A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE see Lane, The Poetics of Legal
Interpretation(Book Review), 87 COLUM. L. REV. 197 (1987). For reviews of LAW'S EMPIRE
see Levenbook, The Sustained Dworkin (Book Review), 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1108 (1986);
Leyh, Dworkin's Hermeneutics (Book Review), 39 MERCER L. REV.851 (1988); Schauer, The
Jurisprudenceof Reasons (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 847 (1987); Stick, Literary Imperialism" Assessing the Results of Dworkin's Interpretive Turn in LAW'S EMPIRE (Book Re-

view), 34 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 371 (1986).
165. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN Tins CLASS? (1980); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1325 (1984); Fish, Interpretationand the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEx. L. REV. 495 (1982);
Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretationin Law and Literature,60 TEx. L. REv. 551
(1982).
166. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
167. Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982); Levinson, What Do
Lawyers Know (And What Do They Do With Their Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and
Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 441 (1985); Levinson, On Interpretation:The Adultery Clause of
the Ten Commandments, 58 S. CAL. REV. 719 (1985).
168. Posner, The EthicalSignificance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1431 (1986); Posner, From BILLY BUDD to Buchenwald (Book Review), 96
YALE L.J. 1173 (1987) (Reviewing R. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION (1984)). Posner,Law and Literature:A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986).
169. R. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN
MODERN FIcTION (1984). For a review of THE FAILURE OF THE WORD see Ayer, The Very

Idea of "Law and Literature"(Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REv. 895 (1987). Although Richard Weisberg's name is linked with the Law and Literature Movement, it is difficult to place
him within the critical branch. As Ayer states:
"[W]orks like Weisberg's pass under the label of 'criticism' as distinct from critical theory. And critics, unblessed with theory, have a tough time getting a place at the academic high table. Aside from works that bear the pretentions of theory, the critics generally have to occupy a place at the back of the hall somewhere between the astrologers
and the phrenologists ....
Id. at 912. 1 have preferred to leave him with the priests at the high table. For another review
of THE FAILURE OF THE WORD see Posner, From BILLY BUDD to Buchenwald (Book Review),
96 YALE L.J. 1173 (1987); Weisberg, Comparative Law in Comparative Literature: The Figure of the "Examining Magistrate" in Dostoevski and Camus, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 237
(1976); Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor
with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1982); Weisberg, Law and
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White.171 Alternatively the discussion might begin with a listing of the vari73
ous symposia which have taken place: Rutgers (1976),17 Texas (1982),'
Southern California (1985),' 74 and most recently, Mercer (1988).1'" The
symposia offer a variety of forums for the lively debate which is taking
place regarding the nature of legal texts and the related question of
whether methods of literary criticism1 6 are useful for the analysis of legal
documents such as constitutions, statutes, and judicial opinions.
Turning to the analysis of legal documents through methods of literary
criticism, we find two diametrically opposed views. One view holds that
methods of literary criticism are valuable tools for interpreting legal texts.
The other view maintains that literary criticism offers nothing to the field of
law. Espousing the view that methods of literary criticism can inform and
instruct us in the interpretation of legal texts, Professor White states:
The lawyer and the literary critic, as readers of texts, face
difficulties and enjoy opportunities that are far more alike than
may seem at first to be the case: in a deep sense, I believe, they
Rhetoric (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 920 (1987) (reviewing J.

WHITE, HERACLES'

Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985)).

170. West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation:Some Reservations about the Law-AsLiterature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203 (1987); West, Authority, Autonomy, and
Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of FranzKafka and Richard
Posner,99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); West, Jurisprudenceas Narrative:An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985); West, Submission, Choice, and
Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1449 (1986).
171. J. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW
(1985). For a review of HERACLES' Bow see Weisberg, Law and Rhetoric (Book Review), 85
MICH. L. REV. 920 (1987). J.WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS
AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY

(1984). For a review of

WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING see Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 209 (1984). See also Miller, A Rhetoric of

Law, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (1985). White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension,
54 TENN. L. REV. 161 (1986); White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem, Ways of Reading,
Ways of Life, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1669 (1984); White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto",
39 MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988); White, Law as Langauge: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 415 (1982).
172. Law and Literature: A Symposium, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 223-331 (1976).
173. Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373-586 (1982).
174. Interpretation Symposium, S. CAL. L. REV. 1-725 (1985).
175. Symposium Law and Literature, 39 MERCER L. REV. 739-935 (1988).
176. For a general introduction into literary criticism see the following works; W.
BOOTH, CRITICAL UNDERSTANDING: THE POWERS AND LIMITS OF PLURALISM (1979); CRITICS
AND CRITICISM (R. Crane ed. 1952); D. DAICHES, CRITICAL APPROACHES TO LITERATURE
(1956 2nd ed. 1981); R. DENHAM, NORTHROP FRYE AND CRITICAL METHOD (1978); G.
HARTMAN, SAVING THE TEXT (1981); N. HOLLAND, THE DYNAMICS OF LITERARY RESPONSE
(1975); F. JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS (1981); READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM (J.
Tompkins ed. 1980); W. WIMSATT, JR. & M. BEARDSLEY, THE VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE
MEANING OF POETRY (1954).
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are the same.
The lawyer must read statutes, cases and other documents
that it is his task to understand, to interpret, and to make real in
the world. This is essential to his work. Of course, he is not only
a reader but a writer as well; his kind of reading completes itself
only in the process of speech and writing by which he argues for
one result or another .

. .

. Indeed

. .

. reading a legal text is

often not so much reading for a single meaning as reading for a
range of possible meanings ...
This is all rather like some current views of reading literature. Literary critics have come to focus on the fact that reading
literature (like reading law) is not merely a process of observing
and receiving, but an activity of the mind and imagination, a
process that requires constant judgment and creation. 17"
To subscribe to Professor White's thesis that reading legal and literary
texts is essentially the same activity would also be to accept the position
that literary critical theory can be used as a tool to interpret legal texts.
"Like law, literature is inherently communal: one learns to read a particular text in part from other readers, and one helps others to read it ....
This is an interpretative culture rather like the culture of argument established by lawyers."' 7 8 Stating that the activity of reading legal texts is an
interpretive process brings us to the objection most frequently raised
against using literary methods to examine legal texts: the objection that
methods of literary criticism-applied in order to interpret texts-cannot
be applied to legal texts where the adjudicative process entails an imperative act, not an interpretive act.
Professor West takes up the challenge-the challenge that literary criticism can offer nothing to law-in an article aptly entitled "Adjudication is
not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As-Literature Movement.'1 7 9 Professor West states:

The analogue of law to literature, on which most of modern interpretivism is based, although fruitful, has carried legal theorists too far. Despite a superficial resemblance to literary interpretation, adjudication is not primarily an interpretive act of
either a subjective or objective nature; adjudication, including
constitutional adjudication, is an imperative act. Adjudication is
in form interpretive, but in substance it is an exercise of power,
in a way which truly interpretive acts, such as literary interpre177.
178.
179.

White, Law as Language, supra note 171, at 415.
Id.
West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation, supra note 170.
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tation, are not. . . . If we lose sight of the difference between
literary interpretation and adjudication, and if we do not see
that the difference between them is the amount of power wielded
by the judiciary as compared to the power wielded by the interpreter, then we have either misconceived the nature of interpretation, or the nature of law, or both."' 0
In a similar vein, Lane,' in reviewing A Matter of Principle by Ronald
Dworkin,' 2 asserts that one "questions the appropriateness of Dworkin's
foray into literary theory. As social practices, law and literature speak to
vastly different human impulses and needs . . . . [I]nterpretation must be a
different thing when understood by literary critics from what it is when
understood by lawyers."' 8 3 The major difference is that "[l]aw comes into
play in regularizing social structures. It works most actively when incommensurable disputes arise, when competing interpretations face one another, and only one must remain at the end. Social integration demands one
right answer .... ,,184 The implication is that literary critics, on the other
hand, are comfortable and politically safe with a system which provides
multiple meanings from which only one meaning need not be selected.
In conclusion, then, there are those who see the use of literary criticism
as a valuable tool for interpreting legal texts and those who believe that
literary criticism has nothing to offer the field of law. The basic disagreement concerns whether adjudication is interpretation or not. On the one
hand, some would say that texts are indeterminate, that judges use subjective preferences in giving meaning to a legal text, and that an act of adjudication is, therefore, interpretation. On the other hand, there are those who
would follow the old Langdellian notion of law as a science--descendants of
the Legal Positivists who would argue that texts are determinate, meaning
is objective, and that an act of adjudication is not interpretation.
Treading the middle path are authors like Dworkin 8 5 and Fiss.186 Professor Fiss bluntly states the following:
Adjudication is interpretation: Adjudication is the process
by which a judge comes to understand and express the meaning
of an authoritative legal text and the values embodied in that
text.
180.

Id. at 207.

181.

Lane, supra note 164.
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 164.
Lane, supra note 164, at 215.
Id. at 216.
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, supra note 164.
Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, supra note 166.

182.

183.

184.
185.
186.
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Interpretation, whether it be in the law or literary domains,
is neither a wholly discretionary nor a wholly mechanical activity. It is a dynamic interaction between187reader and text, and
meaning the product of that interaction.

Accepting that adjudication is a form of interpretation "would build
bridges between law and the humanities and suggest a unity among man's
many intellectual endeavors . .

.

. [and it] might enable us to come to

terms with a new nihilism, one that doubts the legitimacy of adjudication ..

."188 In reacting to the nihilism of the deconstructionists,

"

Fiss

accepts the premise that "for any text there are any number of possible
meanings and the interpreter creates a meaning by choosing one." 190 Fiss
postulates that the "freedom of the interpreter is not absolute. .

.

.He is

disciplined by a set of rules that specify the relevance and weight to be
assigned to the material (e.g., words, history, intention, consequence), as
well as by those that define basic concepts and that established the procedural circumstances under which the interpretation must occur."

91

While Fiss is developing his set of "disciplining rules," Dworkin is
working on his chain novel.1" Like Fiss, Dworkin views law as interpretation. To Dworkin, legal practice can be summarized in the following
manner:
[L]egal practice is an exercise in interpretation not only when
lawyers interpret particular documents or statutes, but generally. Law so conceived is deeply and thoroughly political ....
But law is not a matter of personal or partisan politics . ..
[We] can improve our understanding of law by comparing legal
interpretation with interpretation in other fields of knowledge,
particularly literature.1 93
To Dworkin, the act of legal interpretation is analogous to the creation of a
chain novel.
Suppose that a group of novelists is engaged for a particular
project and that they draw lots to determine the order of play.
The lowest number writes the opening chapter of a novel, which
he or she then sends to the next number who adds a chapter,
with the understanding that he is adding a chapter to that novel
187. Id. at 739.
188. Id. at 740.
189. See, e.g., H. BLOOM, P. DEMAN, J. DERRIDA, G. HARTMAN &
STRUCTION AND CRITICISM (1979).
190. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,supra note 166, at 762.
191. Id. at 744.
192. Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,supra note 164.
193. Id. at 527.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/2

J. MILLER, DECON-

Gemmette: Law and Literature: An Unnecessarily Suspect Class in the Libera

LAW AND LITERATURE

19891

rather than beginning a new one, and then sends the two chapters to the next number, and so on. Now every novelist but the
first has the dual responsibilities of interpreting and creating
194

Like the chain novelist, the judge is constrained: "He must interpret what
has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance the enterprise at
hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own." 195 Using
those constraints, "he must determine, according to his own judgment, what
the earlier decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice so far,
taken as a whole, really is."'196 Having set the ground rules, let us look at
Dworkin's chain novelist in action.
Suppose, for a moment, that someone working on the chain novel decided that he did not wish to be constrained by the dull characters and drab
setting painted by his predecessors and that he wished to "strike out in
some new direction of his own."'' 9 How might he achieve this? And what
would be the consequences? If he were creative, he might decide to begin
his chapter:
Jonathon woke up from a dream in which he lived in this
dreary castle surrounded by Poe-like swooning maidens. He was
relieved now to see his computer in the corner of his bedroomand to know that Vanna would be knocking on his door sometime before the helicopter arrived. He was especially elated to
realize that his name wasn't Freda and that he didn't wear
women's clothing.
Now obviously, the consequences of this unexpected turn would unhinge reader expectations. The reader has tolerance for ambiguity, for the
unexpected, for the ironic twist, or the O'Henry ending, but that tolerance
is not unlimited. Although the reader is able to "suspend disbelief"9 8 while
reading a science fiction novel, he will throw up his hands in despair if the
writer dupes him in the way that was just suggested. He is likely to ask
himself if the text had multiple authors, or he is likely to conclude that the
novelist is a poor craftsman who has neither sharpened his tools nor studied
the rules of his trade. The very object of the chain novel is to make the
writing and style appear so consistent that the reader is unable to discern
one voice from another. That 'is also the aim of judicial opinions-to make
the reasoning and logic flowing from one decision to the next follow auto194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 541.
Id. at 543.
Id.
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,supra note 164, at 543.
SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA,
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matically, naturally. Both the writer of the chain novel and the writer of the
judicial opinion are constrained by similar rules which are part of the craft
of each writer. The chain novelist utilizes these rules as he adds to and
interprets previous texts whereas the judge utilizes these rules as he adds to
and interprets legal texts. But "[e]ven the first novelist has the responsibility of interpreting to the extent any writer must, which includes not only
interpreting as he writes but interpreting the genre in which he sets out to
write . .

.

.[I]t will nevertheless be true, for all novelists beyond the first,

that the assignment to find (what they believe to be) the correct interpretation of the text so far is a different assignment from the assignment to
begin a new novel of their own."' 19 9 Although the first writer is free to locate his novel in time and space, he is, like the chain novelist who attempts
to branch off in a totally new direction, constrained by the rules of the craft
peculiar to the novelist. As Fish notes: He is both "free and constrained" at
the same time. 00 Fish and Dworkin are in disagreement regarding the
amount of freedom that the first chain novelist may exercise. To Fish
.... 201 Enough!
Enticing as the theories of both Fish and Dworkin may be, my role
here is not to become partisan. There are voices aplenty to achieve this task.
Professor Fish in his essays-"Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation
in Law and Literature" 20 2 and "Fish v. Fiss" 203--debates, discusses, and
denies the validity of the theories of both Dworkin and Fiss. Judge Posner 204 has a running dialectic with West. 20 5 Graf2 00 argues with Levinson. 20 7 The cacophony of voices is the very essence of the critical branch of
the Law and Literature Movement.
Turning to the many discordant voices echoing in the law reviews, we
hear Professor White proclaiming: "[W]e cannot expect the 'law and literature movement' to tell us how to decide cases, or to teach us lessons, or to
offer us a technology that might supplant the law. We should instead expect, or hope, for variety, for the distinct sounds of a thousand voices
199.
200.

Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,supra note 164, at 541 n.6.
Fish, Working on the Chain Gang, supra note 165, at 553.

201.

For a discussion of the Dworkin-Fish debate see Schelly, Interpretation in Law:

The Dworkin-Fish Debate (Or, Soccer Amongst the Gahuku-Gama), 73 CAL. L. REv. 158

(1985).
202.
203.
204.
205.

Fish, Working on the Chain Gang, supra note 165.
Fish, Fish v. Fiss, supra note 165.
Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice, supra note 168.
West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice and Submission, Choice and Ethics, supra

note 170.
206. Graff, "Keep off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEx. L. REv. 405 (1982).
207. Levinson, Law as Literature, supra note 167.
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,,208 To White, the Law and Literature Movement should offer "no
Manifesto. ' 20 9 And Dworkin, in the same vein, adds:
Lawyers would do well to study literary and other forms of artistic interpretation. That might seem bad advice (choosing the
fire over the frying pan) because critics themselves are thoroughly divided about what literary interpretation is, and the situation is hardly better in the other arts. But that is exactly why
lawyers should study these debates. Not all of the battles within
literary criticism are edifying or even comprehensible, but many
more theories of interpretation have been defended in literature
than in law, and these include theories that challenge the flat
distinction between
description and evaluation that has enfee210
bled legal theory.
....

My role now is to argue that it is time to bring these lively debates into
the law school classroom. Looking back at what the critics have been saying, we see that they have themselves been hinting at this very point:
Professor White: "The lawyer must read the statutes, cases and
other documents that it is his task to understand, to interpret,
and to make real in his world .

. .

. [He reads] for a range of

-

possible meanings. "211
Professor Dworkin: "Lawyers would do well to study literary
212
.. . interpretation."
Unfortunately the "lawyers" who are currently being exposed to literary theory as a tool for legal analysis are primarily the non-practicing attorneys who divide their time between teaching and scholarship.2 18 "Teaching
involves the imparting of knowledge: Scholarship the discovery of knowledge." 214 But the professors who seek knowledge through scholarship cannot wait for one critic to stand up and claim: "I hold these truths to be selfevident." If we subscribe to Fiss' well-accepted theory that "[i]nterpretation
• . . is neither a wholly discretionary nor a wholly mechanical activity," 2115
and that "meaning" is a dynamic exchange between text and reader, then
"knowledge" and "truth" are ends to be continually sought but never
achieved. The text is always potentiality, never actuality-it is always in a
208.

White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto", supra note 171, at 751.

209. Id. at 743.
210. Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, supra note 164, at 530-31.
211. White, Law as Language, supra note 171, at 415.
212. Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, supra note 164, at 529.
213. But see supra note 16 which indicates that some student lawyers are already being
exposed to critical legal theory.
214. Nelson, Standards of Criticism, 60 TEx. L. REV. 447, 449 (1982).
215. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,supra note 166, at 739.
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state of "becoming." All that can be accomplished is to give transient
"meaning" to a text to make it the "best it can be"'21 6 at some moment in
time and space to one or several readers. The law professor can never impart "knowledge" about the meaning of a legal text to the student; the best
he can do is to teach the student to read the text critically by using the
methods of New Critical Theory to search for meaning and to determine
ambiguity. As Socrates pronounced in the Phaedrus:
Then the intending student of the art of rhetoric ought, in the
first place, to make a systematic division of words, and get hold
of some mark distinguishing the two kinds of words, those
are bound to fluctuate,
namely in the use of which the multitude
217
and those in which they are not.

Once the ambiguities are isolated from the text, let the student use all
available methods of literary criticism-socio-economic, psychoanalytic,
Marxist, existential, feminist, strict constructionist, reader-response, historical, comparative, archetypal or symbolic-in order to add his voice to the
interpretive process.
V.

CONCLUSION

As this work progressed, I was constantly reminded of the verse:
"Will you walk into my parlor?" said the
spider to the fly;
'Tis the prettiest little parlor that
ever you did spy.
The way into my parlour is up a winding
stair.
to show
And I have many curious things
21 8
you when you're there."
The time has come for the spiders to recognize that the flies deserve more
than a passing reference to the Plain Meaning Rule, the Mischief Rule, and
the Golden Rule in some obscure legal research and writing class. Let the
spiders reveal their "curious" wares to the flies in order to make the parlour
a more "habitable" 2119 place. In answer to the age-old question which
haunted Stevens: Law school education is now both a professional and an
academic pursuit where students are not mere repositories of "knowledge";
they are scholars actively engaged in the illusive search for "truth."

216. Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,supra note 164, at 591 n.6.
217. THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 509 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns eds., 9th
printing, 1978).
218. MARY HowiTT, The Spider and the Fly, in The Book of Verse 176-78 (B. Stevenson ed. 1949).
219. Hegland, supra note 83, at 1221.
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APPENDIX I
"LAW AND LITERATURE" COURSES OFFERED AT THIRTYEIGHT ABA APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS

INSTITUTION: AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON
COLLEGE OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: 24/1000. Offered for the first time in 1988-89. 2nd and
3rd year students.
PROFESSOR: Peter A. Jaszi, B.A., 1968; J.D., 1971, Harvard University.
OBJECTIVE: "A number of people have asked me what the seminar will
be 'about,' and my only partly facetious answer has been that I really don't
know, and won't until the semester is complete. At the most specific level, I
know at least some of the particular subjects to which I hope our discussions will be recurrently addressed: the analogies between law-making and
literary creativity, the similarities and differences between reading literary
and non-literary texts, legal conceptions of authorship and the creative process, competing visions of 'justice' and 'right' in non-legal literature, the
content of literary critiques of law and the legal profession, 'modern' and
'post-modern' critical theory and their significance for understanding law,
and law as a literary metaphor for the human condition. And at the most
general level, I have an idea about why these things are worth discussion,
which has to do (at least in part) with the insularity of most legal education: Any attempt to look at our discipline from an external perspective,
rather than the internal ones we ordinarily employ, is bound to pay
dividends."
READING LIST: The reading is structured historically: Ancient Mesopotamian Law and Literature; Medieval Lawyers and Authors in England
and France; Concepts of Law and Justice in Elizabethan England; Making
and Reading Legal Texts in the 16th and 17th Centuries; Satires on Law
and the Legal Profession from the Late 18th and 19th Centuries. This historical review is followed by readings in American literary and popular culture with emphasis on law and lawyers and the jury system. Finally, the
course turns to legal humor as a literary form, the problem of crime, the
problem of punishment, and law and legal process as metaphors for existential dilemmas. The list draws from works of history, poetry, literary criticism, philosophy, autobiography, novels, movies, plays, and ancient legal
codes.
COMMENTS: This is one of many new courses in Law and Literature and
it is obvious from the above that Professor Jaszi has given a great deal of
thought to his syllabus. It is a significant listing dealing with works of fic-
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tion and non-fiction in an historical perspective while at the same time dealing with critical theory and the reading of literary and non-literary texts.
The end of the course has an emphasis on the existential works of Melville,
Kafka and Sartre. Professor Jaszi is the author of Brief of Appellant Edward de Vere, Seventeenth Earl of Oxford, in Re Shakespeare: The Authorship of Shakespeare on Trial, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 645 (1988); Reply
Brief of Appellant Edward de Vere, Seventeenth Earl of Oxford, in Re
Shakespeare: The Authorship of Shakespeare on Trial, 37 AM. U. L. REv.
799 (1988); Who Cares Who Wrote Shakespeare? in Re Shakespeare: The
Authorship of Shakespeare on Trial, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 617 (1988).
GRADING: Student participation, two short (10-15 page) papers, a brief
take-home examination.
INSTITUTION: DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: Course not offered in 1987-88.
PROFESSOR: N/A
OBJECTIVE: "An examination of lawyers' roles and legal problems in fiction and other literary forms. The semester may also consider the significance of contemporary theories of literary criticism for legal analysis."
(Catalogue)
READING LIST: N/A

COMMENTS: Although the course has emphasized the traditional look at
the "lawyers' roles and legal problems in fiction and other literary forms,"
it should be noted that there is the possible inclusion of works of contemporary literary criticism. This serves to underscore the emerging emphasis and
interest in literary criticism not only as a forum for discussion between law
professors but as valuable course material.
GRADING: Paper required.
INSTITUTION: FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF
LAW

COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: 20/550. Offered once a year.
PROFESSOR: Harold P. Southerland, B.S., 1956, U.S. Military Academy;
J.D., 1966, University of Wisconsin.
OBJECTIVE: "This is an unusual course for a law school. It does not deal
with legal rules or principles, or directly invoke or concern the legal system.
It makes no use of literary studies that implicate legal philosophy or jurisprudential issues, and it does not offer any of the well-known fictional treatments of law and lawyers. What this course does concern is human beings:
what they do, what they say, what they want, and how they behave. .

.

.In

these books, you will see how easily the law has been laid hold of and bent
and shaped to the felt necessities of the times. You will gain a heightened
sense of what human beings are capable of, particularly under stress, and
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particularly when their individual identities are safely and anonymously
merged in the cost-benefit conscious, rationalistic, faceless, amoral entity
called "the state"-dedicated to securing the greatest good for the greatest
number and with a legal monopoly of force in pursuit of that end."
READING LIST: Six novels. The course is structured historically from
1914 with the beginning of World War I to the present day. Each novel
captures the life and times of a given period in history: Paths of Glory-set
in 1915; Ship of Fools-the period between the two great wars; Guard of
Honor-the midst of World War II; The Book of Daniel-the McCarthy
era; A Flag for Sunrise-the 1960s and 1970s; The Thanatos Syndrome-the present.
COMMENTS: Professor Southerland's 13-page introduction to this course
reads like an academic paper and serves to illustrate how a course in Law
and Literature can capture the very essence of the possibilities inherent in
the teaching of the Liberal Arts and the Humanities in the law school curriculum. The students are exposed to serious literature considered in an historical framework. Both the literature itself and the framework within
which it is presented lend insight and understanding to the human condition
in all of its complicated and complex psychological and sociological states.
The course is designed to make students reflect on the world around them
and themselves. As Professor Southerland states: "In reflecting on the values, concerns, capabilities, and motivations of people, you will hopefully
learn more about them, and about yourself."
GRADING: Pass/Fail. Six essays of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 words
each. Class attendance is required.
INSTITUTION: HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
COURSE TITLE: Dickens and the Law (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: N/A
PROFESSOR: Robert Coles, A.B., Harvard University, 1950; M.D., Columbia University, 1954. Professor of Psychiatry and Medical Humanities.
OBJECTIVE: "It is hoped that students will use a particular novelist's inspired vision as a means of looking at today's American law as well as
yesterday's English law." (Catalogue)
READING LIST: The course concentrates on Bleak House-"procedural
eternity"; A Tale of Two Cities-"law'slink to politics, to political ideology
and social change"; Great Expectations--"the lawyer's connection to the
fate of individuals, to family life"; and Little Dorrit-observations on criminology and prison life, of an entire industrial order." There is also included
a segment of literary criticism such as George Orwell's essay "Charles
Dickens."
COMMENTS: This course falls within the Law and Literature tradition
encompassing that field of legal study which uses great works of fiction to
study the lawyer, the legal profession, the legal system, and the social milieu in which the competing protagonists and antagonists find themselves
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immersed. It is a study of "The law, its possibilities, hazards, and discontents, through the eyes of Charles Dickens." (Catalogue). Once again, we
notice the growing emphasis on the inclusion of literary criticism in a Law
and Literature course.
GRADING: One or more papers.
INSTITUTION: INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: 20-25/650-750. Offered once a year to upper level law
students.
PROFESSOR: David Ray Papke, A.B., 1969, Harvard University; J.D.,
1973; M.A., 1973, Yale University; Ph.D., 1984, University of Michigan
(American Studies). Five other professors are expected to teach the course,
but only Professor Papke has taught it up to this time.
OBJECTIVE:
1) "A course in law and literature can be a vehicle through which
interested faculty members may develop and share a special variety of academic work. ..

."

2) "The course may be a remedy, albeit a partial and tardy one, for
the narrowly specialized pre-law educations of many law students. .. ."
3) "The course should alert students to the moral and ethical dimensions of the law and in the process stimulate broader humanistic thinking
and dialogue about legal concerns. .. "
4) "The course should enrich and empower legal professionals in their
subsequent careers. The course should improve reading, writing and speaking skills, and more importantly, it should enable participants to reflect earnestly on legal authority and authority in general. .. ."
READING LIST: This varies from semester to semester but follows three
basic types:
1) A traditional "law in literature" course centered around poems,
short stories, plays and novels-the four genres of college English
courses-which deal with legal themes and theories.
2) A traditional "literature in law" course. This course "emphasizes
the literary features of rules, statutes, appellate opinions and jurisprudential
writings. Highlighting the personae, mimesis, narrative and interpretive
meaning of the law. . .

."

One wonders whether the reading includes:

It may be a line from Kipling or the dolorous refrain of
"The Tennessee Waltz"; a whiff of hickory smoke; the running
of the fingers across a swatch of corduroy; the sweet carbonation
of a chocolate soda; the sight of a faded snapshot in a longneglected album. All that is required is that it may trigger the
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Proustian moment. It may be anything which produces the desired testimonial prelude, "It all comes back to me now." Judge
Moylan, Maryland Appellate Court, Baker v. State, 35 Md.
App. 593, 371 A.2d 699 (1977).
3) A course combining literary and legal assignments which "seeks in
a more interdisciplinary manner to explore the shared linguistic and normative fabrics of law and literature." Suggested topics: Law and Literature in
Nineteenth-Century America; Law and Literature in a Post-Modern
World; The Literature and Law of Civil Disobedience; Literary Views of
Insanity.
The reading list which was supplied by Professor Papke for a course in
Law and Literature opens with his own work "Neo-Marxists, Nietzcheans
and New Critics: The Voice of the Contemporary Law and Literature Discourse." This is followed by seven novels, a handful of short stories,
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's "Commencement Address" and Jack W. Ledbetter's "The Trial of Billy Budd, Foretopman" (1972). This course takes an
historical look at works of literature, this time centering on the themes of
law, lawyers, legal institutions and justice.
COMMENTS: The faculty of Indiana University School of Law/
Indianapolis has contemplated the role of, and reasons for, the inclusion of
Law and Literature or Literature in Law in their curriculum. Of particular
interest is the third type of course which they offer and which is said to be
"to date, [the] most fruitful type of course." This is the course most representative of an interdisciplinary approach to the use of literature in the law
school curriculum.
Professor Papke and fellow colleagues welcome an exchange of sample
syllabi and suggested assignments from other persons working in or interested in this area of teaching and scholarship. From their own faculty have
come published essays and articles as well as paper presentations at conferences sponsored by the Law and Humanities Institute, Law and Society
Association, ABA Commission on College and University Non-professional
Legal Studies, and American Culture Association. Professor Papke is the
author of Law and Literature:A Comment and Bibliography of Secondary
Works, 73 LAW LIBR. J. 421 (1980); Neo-Marxists, Nietzcheans, and New
Critics: The Voices of the Contemporary Law and Literary Discourse, 1985
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J., 883; The Writer on Wall Street: An Interview with
Louis Auchincloss, 5 AM. L. Soc'y A. F. 5 (1981).
GRADING: Attendance, participation, and either a final examination, approved project, or 25-page essay.
INSTITUTION: LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
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COMMENTS: This course was offered in the past, but the professor who
taught it recently retired.
INSTITUTION: LOYOLA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW/
CHICAGO
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 10-12/750.
PROFESSOR: William T. Braithwaite, B.A., 1961, Virginia Military Institute; J.D., 1964, Washington and Lee University.
COMMENTS: Professor Briathwaite is the author of Poetry and the Criminal Law: The Idea of Punishment in Shakespeare's "Measure for Measure". 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 791 (1982).
INSTITUTION: NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 10-15/1100.
OBJECTIVE: "To enhance the student's appreciation of the law's impact
on society and response to societal problems and to expand the breadth of
the law student."
INSTITUTION: NOVA UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 15-30-/690. The course is offered annually to 2nd and
3rd year students.
PROFESSOR: Michael Lloyd Richmond, A.B., (English), 1967, Hamilton
College; J.D., 1971, Duke University; M.S.L.S., 1974, University of North
Carolina.
OBJECTIVE:
1) To "show interaction between literary devices and law."
2) To "explore differing treatments of common themes."
3) To "view law from the standpoint of the author."
4) To "enhance awareness of great literature."
READING LIST: Professor Richmond kindly shared the reading list which
he has in preparation for a proposed text designed for both pre-law and law
school students. Although this work is composed of poetry, short stories,
plays, and novel excerpts, it is not centered around a traditional Law and
Literature course. Instead, the works are used to teach the rhetorical modes
of description, exposition, narration, and argumentation; to teach simile,
metaphor, fable, allegory, parable, inference, satire, ambiguity; to look at
the writers' views on death. The reading list is ambitious, diverse, and enticing. One senses in this collection yet another law professor concerned with
the lack of learning within the legal profession. As he himself states: "The
thought that we will soon have a generation of attorneys who haven't read
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Shakespeare, for whom Gilbert is an author of [legal study aids] rather
than a librettist, or who think F. Lee Bailey wrote The Trial is chilling."
COMMENTS: The influence of James B. White's book, The Legal Imagination, echoes throughout Professor Richmond's proposed book and this
debt is acknowledged by Professor Richmond. Although the course is entitled "Law and Literature," it might better be called "The Legal Imagination" in the White tradition.
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: PACE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: 5-10/800. Offered every one or two years to upperclass
students.
PROFESSOR: Judith Schenck Koffier, A.B., 1969, Douglass College; J.D.,
1972, Boston University; LL.M., 1976, Harvard University.
OBJECTIVE: "Explore visions of the law and justice in selected works of
literature."
READING LIST: Mostly Dickens (as a "legal reformer" and artist who
shows law in society as "corrupt, irresponsible, exploitative, incompetent,
irrational and inhuman"); Melville, Dostoevsky, and Shakespeare. The list
also includes "Njal's Saga."
COMMENTS: This is yet another "Law and Literature" course in the
traditional sense of the word. Professor Koffier emphasizes the need to use
critical thought in reading literary texts in a way akin to legal analysis, and
in the introduction to the course articulates one of the obvious, yet much
overlooked, facts that the use language is also the "lawyer's medium." Professor Koffier is the author of Fleurs de Mal: Literary Stultification in
Law, 5 Am. L. Soc'y. A. F., 23 (1981); Terror and Mutilation in the
Golden Age, 5 HUM. RTs. Q. 116 (1983).
GRADING: Attendance, participation, an oral report (20-30 minutes), and
2 or 3 short papers.
INSTITUTION: SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 40/950. Each summer to 1st, 2nd, and 3rd year law
students.
PROFESSOR: David Samuelson, A.B., 1968; A.M., 1971; Ph.D. (English
Language and Literature), 1977, University of Michigan.
OBJECTIVE: "To expose students to broad legal themes (Law and Morality, Law and Authority, Law and Freedom, Law and Punishment) as
presented in selected poems, plays, short stories, movies, and essays."
READING LIST: The course begins with introductory materials in naturalist and positivist legal theory and then deals mostly with plays, novels,
short stories, and Billy Budd.
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COMMENTS: This is another course dealing primarily with works of fiction but, once again, there is some emphasis on legal theory.
GRADING: Participation, attendance, several short papers (2-3 pages on
each work covered in class), and a final exam.
INSTITUTION: STETSON UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 24/500. Once in Spring 1987 to 2nd and 3rd year
students.
PROFESSOR: Three faculty members are expected to teach the course;
one has a masters degree in English.
OBJECTIVE: To consider "law in society, use of literary works to raise
legal issues, the individual and society."
READING LIST: The list is composed of short stories, novels, and plays.
COMMENTS: Surprisingly, this is the only list to include Hawthorne's
The Scarlet Letter. In fact, The Scarlet Letter is the only work of Hawthorne to be included on any list. As Hawthorne was the master at dealing
with the theme of guilt, one might have expected to have seen The House
of the Seven Gables or The Marble Faun included somewhere in the
materials.
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 6-14/1600. 2nd, 3rd, and 4th year students.
PROFESSOR: Edward J. Bander, B.A., 1949; LL.B., 1951, Boston University; M.S.L.S., 1955, Simmons University.
OBJECTIVE: To "familiarize the students with great literature that has a
legal setting."
READING LIST: The syllabus for the course is extensive, ambitious, and
all-inclusive. The course begins with a lecture on "What Every Student
Should Know About Charles Dickens, A Study in Character." This lecture
is open to all students whether or not they are enrolled in the Law and
Literature course. After that the reading centers around the genres of the
novel, the short story, the theater, and poetry. The themes dealt with are
the Law of Necessity; Humor and the Law; Trials as Literature; Film, TV,
and the Law; and Judicial Writing as Literature.
COMMENTS: Although the course is designed to expose the student to
"great literature that has a legal setting," Professor Bander includes one
segment on Judicial Writing as Literature. This is what has been known
traditionally as Literature in Law. Of the reading lists received in response
to this survey, only a few include a selection from this source of literature,
and usually, like Professor Bander's list, they emphasize the writings of
Cardozo. Professor Bander's interest in the area of Law and Literature is
evident in his compilation, with Dean Marke, of the Dean's List of Recomhttps://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/2
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mended Reading for Pre-Law and Law Students, 1958, and A New List of
Recommended Reading for Prospective Law Students, 83 MICH. L. REv.
663 (1985). He is also the author of Anecdotes About the Supreme Court,
73 LAw LIBR. J. 230 (1980); Legal Humor Dissected, 75 LAW LIER. J. 289
(1982); A Survey of Legal Humor Books, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1065
(1985).
GRADING: Attendance; ten pages of written work which counts for '1 of
the grade--one short paper relating "the implications of the book you select
to your experience as a law student and your goal in practicing law. . . a
short paper on the use that courts make of literature . . . use of Lexis and

Westlaw to find references; a final examination."
INSTITUTION: SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Tutorial-Not a course.
ENROLLMENT: 5/600. 2nd and 3rd years students.
PROFESSOR: Barbara B. Burnett, B.A., 1969, University of Kansas; J.D.,
1972, New York University.
OBJECTIVE: "Fun."
COMMENTS: Professor Burnett offers one of the best reasons for teaching
the course and perhaps she is the only one who dares to say it.
READING LIST: N/A
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: TULANE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: 20 (8 on a waiting list)/766.
PROFESSOR: Jeanne Louise Carriere. B.A., 1970, Dominican College;
M.A., 1972; Ph.D., 1975, U.C.L.A.; J.D., 1986, Tulane University.
OBJECTIVE: N/A
READING LIST: This list centers around the following topics: Reading
Law and Reading Literature; The Search for Stable Meaning; Is There a
Meaning in This Text?; Adjudication as Literary Activity; Interdisciplinary
Comparison; The Validity of Comparison and a Comparative Exercise; Adjudication as Interpretation; If Adjudication is Not Interpretation, What is
It?; Reservations and Revenge; The Future Role of Literary Theory in
Law. Besides the heavy emphasis on literary criticism, there are also a few
judicial opinions, Kafka's "The Hunger Artist," and O'Connor's "A Good
Man is Hard to Find."
COMMENTS: As the above topics reflect, this course primarily utilizes
literary theory. The nature of the material is revealed by a glance at the
authors: White, Fiss, Fish, Levinson, Graff, West, Posner, Dworkin, Stick.
Should it come as a surprise to learn that there is a waiting list for a course
structured around literary criticism? Or, does the waiting list tell us that
the students are ready and capable of dealing with what was formerly the
province of a few professors who began to cross interdisciplinary lines?
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GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: TOURO COLLEGE SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
COMMENTS: "The course was approved but has not yet been offered at
the Law School."
INSTITUTION: THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA SCHOOL OF
LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law in Literature Seminar.
ENROLLMENT: 12-15/485. Occasionally to 2nd and 3rd year students.
PROFESSOR: Timothy Hoff, A.B., 1963; J.D., 1966, Tulane University;
LL.M., 1970, Harvard University.
OBJECTIVE: To focus "on works of literary merit that are concerned with
law and its effects upon individuals and society."
READING LIST: Works of Camus, Dickens, Kafka, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky,
Arthur Miller, Osborne, Brecht, Barth, Golding, Faulkner, Harper Lee,
and Melville.
COMMENTS: As the actual works of the authors which are taught in this
course were not listed, they are not included in the cumulative bibliography.
The University of Alabama also offers a one-credit course on legal themes
and the images of lawyers in Dickens' Bleak House, Great Expectations,
and A Tale of Two Cities. Professor Hoff is the author of THEOLOGICAL
INFLUENCES ON WESTERN LAW (1985) (reviewing Berman, Law and
Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, 36 ALA. L.
REV. 1003 (1983)).
GRADING: "Based on final course examination extra credit of up to
letter grade for superior contribution to class discussions." The student also
makes a brief oral presentation and leads class discussion in at least one
class meeting.
INSTITUTION: THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA COLLEGE OF
LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: N/A
PROFESSOR: Kenney F. Hegland, LL.B., 1966, University of California/
Berkeley; LL.M., 1974, Harvard University.
OBJECTIVE: To be gleaned from the following: "Finally, had I written to
you who have taken the seminar and are now in that Great Beyond, I would
have once again played teacher, whose lot in life, it seems, is to raise inconvenient questions: The issue is not whether you agree with Tolstoi, Sacken,
or the other students. Now the issue is you and what you have become."
READING LIST: Dean Hegland included with his response to this study
an open letter to his past students. That letter listed twenty-eight
works-mostly novels and plays-which were meant to jog the memories of
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/2
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those now practicing lawyers. The books were mostly classics but the odd
thought provoking newcomer showed up-notably Pirsig's Zen and the Art
of Motorcycle Maintenance.
COMMENTS: A quotation from Professor Hegland's letter captures the
beginnings of the Law and Literature movement:
Had I written to you who have taken the course, I would have reported
that things go well here at the school. Law and Literature, founded as a
clandestine seminar

. . .

is now out in the open and thriving. It devel-

ops that many on the faculty, in addition to teaching Agency and Partnership, love reading and discussing books. . .. I remember the First

Fearful Years of Law and Literature, when we met almost secretly,
firm in the belief that the "regular" faculty would "never approve."
How wrong we were. Law and Literature Alumni, consider this: If
Agency and Partnership Professors enjoy an occasional evening discussing Shakespeare, can senior partners

. . .

be far behind? Dare you eat

a peach?
How wonderful if those former students caught the allusions! To those former students, Professor Hegland also sent the Dean's Recommended List of
Readings, presumably, to inspire and motivate continued interest in the
field of law and literature. Professor Hegland is the author of Goodbye to
Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1985).
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF BRIDGEPORT SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and the Humanities.
ENROLLMENT: Unknown/750. Approximately once every 2 years. 2nd,
3rd & 4th year evening students.
PROFESSOR: Adjunct.
OBJECTIVE: The objective is to have students reflect on the Western legal
tradition and what the practice of law and being a lawyer has entailed in
the course of history.
READING LIST: N/A
COMMENTS: As no reading list was provided, it is impossible to determine what works are stressed in this course. It should be noted also that
this is a Law and Humanities course rather than a Law and Literature
course.
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF
LAW/DAVIS
COURSE TITLE: Legal Imagination.
ENROLLMENT: 10-14/500. Once a year.
PROFESSOR: John D. Ayer, A.B., 1963, J.D., 1968, University of
Louisville; LL.M., 1969, Yale University.
OBJECTIVE: N/A
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READING LIST: Based on James B. White's Book entitled The Legal
Imagination.
COMMENTS: For obvious reasons, Professor Ayer was reluctant to include a course based on The Legal Imagination in a survey of courses in
the Law and Literature tradition. As he says: "For theoretical reasons that
are somewhat tedious to explain, I don't like to call this a 'law and lit'
course. Nevertheless, I recognize that many other people do, and will continue to do so." The convenience of rubrics may certainly have led to the
pigeon-holing of this course where, in fact, it does not belong. Professor
Ayer is the author of Law, Literature,and the "Conversation of Mankind,"
4 CARDOZO ART AND ENT. L.J. 261 (1985); The Very Idea of "Law and

Literature," 85 MIcH. L. REv. 895 (1987) (reviewing Richard Weisberg,
The Failureof the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern Fiction
(1984)).
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: 25/170. Offered twice each year. 2nd and 3rd year
students.
PROFESSOR: Judge Richard Posner, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer.
OBJECTIVE: "Professor is interested in literature as a field of study."
READING LIST: N/A
COMMENTS: The response to the survey was not received from Judge
Posner himself, but see his writings: The Ethical Significance of Free
Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1431 (1986); From
Billy Budd to Buchenwald, 96 YALE L.J. 1173 (1987) (reviewing Richard
H. Weisberg, The Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in
Modern Fiction (1984)); Law and Literature:A Relation Reargued, 72 VA.
L. REv. 1351 (1986); LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).

GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT SCHOOL OF
LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature (Lawyers and Fiction Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: 15-20/500. 2nd and 3rd year students. Course is jointly
taught by one full-time professor and one adjunct instructor.
PROFESSORS: Lewis S. Kurlantzick, B.A., 1965, Wesleyan University;
LL.B., 1968, Harvard University. William Domnarski, B.A., 1976, South
Connecticut S. U.; M.A., 1978, University of Chicago; M.A., 1980, J.D.,
1983, University of Connecticut.
OBJECTIVE: To deal with the following themes:
-The relationship of the law in theory and practice
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-Why a person might choose the life of a lawyer
-The effects of practicing on the lawyer morally, emotionally, and
intellectually
-The susceptibility of lawyers to particular personal problems and
attitudes.
-Cynicism as a common characteristic of attorneys
-The manner in which the lawyer views himself in the context of the
legal system and the broader society
-The manner in which the lawyer views other participants in the
system.
-The interactions between lawyers and clients
READING LIST: Novels and short stories.
COMMENTS: The reading list for this course is less conspicuously composed of classical works than many of the other lists are. The humor is
present yet again-this time in the Rumpole stories. Professor Domnarski is
the author of Hearing the Judicial Voices, 61 CONN. B. J. 155 (1987);
Law-Literature Criticism: Chartinga Desirable Course with Billy Budd, 34
J. LEGAL EDUC. 702 (1984); A Novelist's Knowing Look at the Law: Short
Stories by John William Corrington,69 A.B.A. J. 1706 (1983); The Opinion as Essay, The Judge as Essayist: Some Observations on Legal Writing,
10 J. LEGAL PROF. 139 (1985); Style and Justice Holmes, 6 DEL. LAW 54
(1987); Trouble in Paradise:Wall Street Lawyers and the Fiction of Louis
Auchincloss, 12 J. CONTEMP. L. 243 (1987).
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF IOWA COLLEGE OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law in Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 12-16/600. This year long course is offered annually to
law students and graduate students.
PROFESSOR: Alan I. Widiss, B.S., 1960; LL.B., 1963, University of
Southern California; LL.M., 1964, Harvard University.
OBJECTIVE: To focus on the following questions:
-What are the origins and sources of law and morality?
-What is the relationship between law and justice?
-What determines whether an individual is treated justly?
-Does justice differ from law?
-Does justice differ from morality?
-What laws, if any, are essential for a society?
READING LIST: Selected reading from writers such as Barth, Camus,
Coetzee, Dostoevski, Faulkner, Ibsen, Kafka, Melville, Plato, Schaffer,
Shaw, Thucydides, and Tolstoy. Also included are other selections such as
the Code of Hammurabi, the Hippocratic Oath, etc.
COMMENTS: Although Professor Widiss' response to the Law and Literature survey referred to Iowa's catalogue description for a course entitled
"Law in Literature"-this is the description used for the entries entitled
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"Objective" and "Reading List" above-Professor Widiss also supplied a
reading list for a course entitled "Law in Literature/medicine in the Humanities" which he team teaches with Professor Caplan. This is a course
which "specializes," so to speak. The reading list for this course is composed primarily of novels, short stories, and plays, all of which deal with
ethical and moral dilemmas of medicine. This is a creative and original use
of works of literature in a law school course and breaks the stereotypical
use of fiction to examine the role of the lawyer in society.
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
COMMENTS: "Offered once in last 10 years-about 1981."
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLES: (A) Jurisprudence in Literature; (B) Idea of Law in
Western Culture (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: 15/570 (day); 15/230 (evenings). Offered annually. 3rd
year law students.
PROFESSOR: Alan. D. Hornstein, A.B., 1965; M.A., Long Island University; J.D., 1970, Rutgers University, Newark; M.A., 1986, St. John's
College.
OBJECTIVE:
(A) Jurisprudence in Literature: N/A;
(B) Idea of Law in Western Culture: "The goal of the seminar is not
the acquisition of knowledge, important as that may be, but the enhancement of understanding."
READING LIST:
(A) Jurisprudence in Literature: The list includes the works of Aeschylus, Melville, Kafka, Shakespeare, Camus, Twain, and Lee; but the richness
of the course lies in its treatment of interpretive literature-Luban, Posner,
Weisberg, West, Unger, Fried, Dworkin, Foss, Cover, Fish, Kennedy, Kelman, Foucault, and MacKinnon. After dealing with Deconstruction in Law,
Deconstruction in Social History, and Deconstruction and Feminism, the
syllabus has a heading "Deconstruction in Literature." Under this is the
notation: "Readable, Descriptive Essays of Deconstruction in Literature
(I'm still looking)." Hopefully, the legal intrusion into deconstruction will
help to clarify and enlighten rather than to further confuse and befuddle
the reader.
(B) Idea of Law in Western Culture: This course deals with philosophers, playwrights, novelists, short story writers, and the Bible to "explore
the notion of law in the tradition of the West through the works of some of
the great contributors to that tradition."
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COMMENTS: A student at Maryland taking both Jurisprudence in Literature and Idea of Law in Western Culture would be exposed to some of the
finest thinkers and writers of both ancient and modern times.
GRADING:
(A) Jurisprudence in Literature: N/A;
(B) Idea of Law in Western Culture: At least 3 and no more than 5
brief papers (750-1000 words) "exploring some problem or issue raised by
the readings or in discussion"; contribution to the weekly discussion; and
possibly a brief oral examination.
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 10/480. Once a year. 2nd and 3rd year students.
PROFESSOR: Teresa Godwin Phelps, B.A., 1973; M.A., 1975; Ph.D.,
1980, Notre Dame.
OBJECTIVE: "To analyze how literary texts can illuminate legal issues."
READING LIST: The course is structured around three topics: The Duty
to Obey the Law; The Nature of Evidence; Judges and Lawyers. The readings are mostly classical novels and plays.
COMMENTS: Notre Dame has a non-lawyer teaching its Law and Literature course; perhaps we will soon begin to see lawyers teaching Law and
Literature in the English departments of large universities. Note also the
inclusion of the opportunity to write a short story to satisfy the course requirements. What a welcome relief from Torts and Contracts! Professor
Phelps is the author of The Criminal as Hero in American Fiction, 1983
Wis. L. REV. 1427; The Story of the Law in Huckleberry Finn, 39 MERCER L. REV. 889 (1988).
GRADING: Attendance, participation, a 10-20 page paper on a law and
literature topic, a 15-20 minute formal report to the class on the topic. Or,
"You may write a short story (10-20 pages) modelled on Norval Morris'
'Ake Dah,' that explicates a legal principle."
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Literature and Law.
ENROLLMENT: 15/700. Offered for the first time fall 1988. 2nd and 3rd
year students.
PROFESSOR: Lawrence A. Frolik, B.A., 1966, University of Nebraska;
J.D., 1969; LL.M., 1972, Harvard University.
OBJECTIVE: "To investigate the degree to which the law represents and
interprets fundamental societal values and norms as expressed in selected
literary works. .

.

.Particular attention shall be paid to whether the princi-

ples of property, contract, tort and criminal law promote or contradict the
values found in the literary sources. By so doing, we should gain richer
understanding of how law is the embodiment of fundamental human needs
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and desires."
READING LIST: This list offers some readings which do not appear on
other lifts: Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath, Drieser's Sister Carrie, Ellison's
Invisible Man, Thompson's Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas. It is what the
professor calls an "eclectic sample of American and British 19th and 20th
century novels and short stories in a search for the expression of fundamental cultural values, norms, and prohibitions to determine how they find expression or rejection in the law."
COMMENTS: This is yet another course which sounds stimulating.
GRADING: Based 50% upon a long paper, 25% upon two short papers,
and 25% upon class participation.
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO SCHOOL OF
LAW
COURSE TITLE: (A) Law and Literature; (B) Law and Literature
(Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: (A) 35/550; (B) 15/550. Once each semester. 2nd and
3rd year students.
PROFESSOR: Carmelo Delgado-Cintron, B.A., 1963; LL.B., 1966 University of Puerto Rico; Doctor En Derecho, 1974, University of Madrid; M.A.,
1977, State University of New York.
OBJECTIVE: Professor: "To study the relationship between both disciplines by looking at how people in literature objectivise law, how they perceive it."
School: "To give students the opportunity to see how literature looks at
law and its actors."
READING LIST: N/A
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND SCHOOL OF
LAW
COURSE TITLE: Language and the Law.
ENROLLMENT: 25/850. Offered yearly. 2nd and 3rd year students.
PROFESSOR: Christopher J. Rideout, B.A., 1972; M.A., 1977; Ph.D.,
1982, University of Washington/Seattle.
OBJECTIVE: This is not quite a law and literature course. Rather, a
course in the discourse of the law. The course demonstrates the many ways
in which law, like literature, arrives at meaning rhetorically and is language-centered. The course combines a comparison of meaning in literary
texts with meaning in legal texts; the course also examines the "rhetoric" of
law and its implications.
READING LIST: Melville, Shakespeare, White's The Legal Imagination,
selections from Heracles' Bow, and selections from When Words Lose
Their Meaning.
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COMMENTS: This "language-centered" course turns naturally to the
works of James B. White.
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA SCHOOL OF
LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 16/650-700. Offered annually. Enrollment limited to law
students and/or honors college students.
PROFESSOR: Robert Louis Felix, B.A., 1956; J.D., 1959, University of
Cincinnati; M.A., 1962, University of British Columbia; LL.M., 1967,
Harvard University.
OBJECTIVE:
1) "To explore literature dealing with issues of legal significance.
2) To teach students how to read literature critically."
READING LIST: As well as the expected selections of plays, novels, and
short stories, the list includes a section devoted to utopias: "Political-Orwell's 1984; Apocalyptic-Golding's The Lord of the Flies; Scientific-Huxley's Brave New World."
COMMENTS: Once again, this is a traditional law and literature course
with emphasis on critical reading. Professor Felix tells me that he also holds
a popcorn and beer session at which movies of related works are shown.
GRADING: "The grade for the course is a 25-30 page paper based on
legal and literary aspects of one or more works not on the reading list."
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE COLLEGE OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: The Legal Imagination.
ENROLLMENT: 30/450. Offered annually. 3rd year law students.
PROFESSOR: N/A
OBJECTIVE: "To explore the potential of and limitations of language."
READING LIST: Fall 1987. The Shakespeare Histories, Measure for
Measure, King Lear.
COMMENTS: Although this course is entitled "The Legal Imagination,"
and although the emphasis is on language, it appears that this is not based
on James B. White's book but rather takes only its title from that work.
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN SCHOOL OF
LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: 12/1550. Offered annually. 2nd and 3rd year students.
INSTITUTION: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 20/900. Advanced standing students.
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COMMENTS: Courses offered infrequently-every two or three years.
INSTITUTION: VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature (Seminar).
ENROLLMENT: 15/354. Offered annually. 3rd year students.
PROFESSOR: Philipp L. Brockington, Jr., B.A., 1962, Amherst College;
J.D., 1965, Harvard University.
OBJECTIVE: "Independent research and writing with two or three texts
discussed as a group."
READING LIST: The reading list varies but in the past has included
Shakespeare, Dickens, Camus, and Miller.
COMMENTS: This course is very much a seminar with group readings
secondary to the independent research and writing emphasis of the course.
GRADING: N/A
INSTITUTION: WASHBURN UNIVERSITY OF TOPEKA SCHOOL
OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 15-20. Offered annually. 2nd and 3rd year students.
PROFESSOR: Gregory J. Pease, B.A., 1963, Wichita State University;
J.D., 1979, University of New Mexico.
OBJECTIVE: "To broaden student perspectives on law."
READING LIST: The list is composed of drama and fiction arranged into
the following units: Origins of the Criminal Law; Natural Law versus Positive Law; The Criminal Act; The Criminal Trial. The books are mostly
classical works used primarily to deal with the criminal and the criminal
process.
COMMENTS: The students are given an extensive list of topics from
which to choose in order to satisfy .the individual writing element of the
course. This course focuses only on criminal law.
GRADING: One group project structuring the class discussion around one
of the required books and a short group-paper based on that project; one
long individual paper.
INSTITUTION: WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF
LAW
COURSE TITLE: Justice in Literature.
ENROLLMENT: 20/230. Fall 1987.
OBJECTIVE: To "expand the Liberal Arts approaches to the law."
READING LIST: N/A
INSTITUTION: YESHIVA UNIVERSITY, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW
COURSE TITLE: Law and Literature I (Seminar); Law and Literature II
(Seminar).
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PROFESSOR: Richard H. Weisberg, M.A., 1967; Ph.D., 1970, Cornell
University; J.D., 1974, Columbia University.
OBJECTIVE:
(I) To show "the relationship of the literary protagonist to the laws of
his society, as portrayed in novels and plays, using texts fundamentally concerned with the law. . .

."

(Catalogue);

(II) To show "the way lawyers use and understand language; theories
of interpretation (in literature and law); modes of judicial communication;
and perennial and recent problems in legal writing generally.
READING LIST: List includes works of Aeschylus, Shakespeare, Dickens,
Dostoevski, Melville, and Camus.
COMMENTS: The first seminar is in the nature of a traditional Law and
Literature course whereas the second seminar emphasizes critical analysis
of the written word. Professor Weisberg is the author of Comparative Law
in ComparativeLiterature: The Figure of the "Examining Magistrate" in
Dostoevski and Camus, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 237 (1976); THE FAILURE OF
THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION

(1984);

How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in BILLY BUDD,
SAILOR, With an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1982); Law and Rhetoric, 85 MICH. L. REV. 920 (1987) (reviewing James
Boyd White, Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the
Law (1985)); A response to Fish and White, 5 Miss. C. L. REV. 57 (1984);
Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution, 20 GA. L.
REV. 939 (1986); Wigmore's "Legal Novels" Expanded: A Collarborative
Effort, 50 N.Y.S.B.J. 123 (1978); Wigmore's "Legal Novels" Revisited:
New Resources for the Expansive Lawyer, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 17 (1976).
GRADING: N/A
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APPENDIX II
A CUMULATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS TAUGHT IN A
NUMBER OF LAW SCHOOL "LAW AND LITERATURE"
COURSES
FICTION
ANONYMOUS: Babylonian Writings.
POEM: The Gilgamesh Epic
TABLETS: Babylonian Creation Epic
ANONYMOUS: Icelandic Narration of the Middle Ages.
SAGA: "Njal's Saga"
AESCHYLUS: 525-456 B.C. Greek Athenian Poet of Tragedy.
POEM: The Oresteia
ANDERSON, MAWELL: 1888-1959. American Educator, Journalist, and
Author.
VERSE PLAY: Winterset
ANOUILH, JEAN: 1910 --.

French Dramatist.

PLAY: Antigone
. American Novelist,

AUCHINCLOSS, STANTON LOUIS: 1917-_
Playwright, and Short Story Writer.
NOVEL: Diary of a Yuppie
SHORT STORY: "The Fabbri Tape"

AUDEN, W.H.: 1907-1973. English (U.S. Citizen 1946) Poet, Dramatist,
Critic, Editor, and Librettist.
POEM: "Law Like Love"
BELL, THOMAS: 1902-1961. American Novelist and Film Script Writer.
NOVEL: Out of this Furnace
BENET, STEPHEN
Librettist.

VINCENT:

1898-1943.

American

LIBRETTO: The Devil and Daniel Webster
BOLT, ROBERT: 1924-
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PLAY: Man for All Seasons
BRECHT, BERTOLT: 1898-1956. German Dramatist, Poet, and Theatrical Producer.
PLAY: The Caucasian Chalk Circle
BUTLER, SAMUEL: 1835-1902. English Writer of Satirical Novels, Scientific Philosophical Works, an Autobiographical Novel, and a Biography
of his Grandfather.
NOVEL: Erehwon
CAMUS, ALBERT: 1913-1960. French Writer affiliated with the
"philosophie de 'absurde." Novelist, Essayist, and Playwright.
NOVEL: The Fall
NOVEL: The Plague
NOVEL: The Stranger
CAPOTE, TRUMAN: 1924-1984. American Writer of Novels and what
he termed "The American Non-fiction Novel."
NON-FICTION NOVEL: In Cold Blood
CHAUCER, GEOFFREY: 1343(?)-1400. First Major English Poet.
POEM: The Canterbury Tales
CHEEVER, JOHN: 1912-1982. American Novelist and Short Story
Writer.
NOVEL: Oh What a ParadiseIt Seems
CHOPIN, KATE O'FLAHERTY: 1851-1904. American Novelist and
Short Story Writer.
SHORT STORY: "The Godmother"
CHRISTIE, AGATHA (MARY CLARISSA): 1890-1976. English Novelist, Short Story Writer, Playwright, and Poet.
PLAY: Witness for the Prosecution
CLARK, WALTER VAN TIBURG: 1909-1971. American Novelist and
Short Story Writer.
NOVEL: The Ox-Bow Incident
COBB, HUMPHREY: 1899-1944. American Author.
NOVEL: Paths of Glory
CONRAD, JOSEPH: 1857-1924. Polish-born Novelist and Short Story
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Writer.
NOVEL: Heart of Darkness
NOVEL: Lord Jim
COOPER, IRVING SPENSER: 1922-1985. American Surgeon, Novelist,
and Writer of Medical Articles and an Autobiography.
NOVEL: It's Hard to Leave While the Music's Playing
COOPER, JAMES FENIMORE: 1789-1851. American Novelist.
NOVEL: The Pathfinder
NOVEL: The Pioneers
CORRINGTON, JOHN WILLIAM: 1932ist, Short Story Writer, Critic, and Playwright.

.

American Poet, Novel-

COLLECTION OF SHORT STORIES: Actes and Monuments
TWO NOVELLAS: All my Trials
COZZENS, JAMES GOULD: 1903-1978. American Novelist and Short
Story Writer.
NOVEL: Guard of Honor
NOVEL: The Just and the Unjust
DENKER, HENRY: 1912--.
American Lawyer, Novelist and Writer
for Radio, T.V., Stage, and Screen.
PLAY: A Case of Libel (Three act-play based on My Life in Court by
Louis Nizer).
DICKENS, CHARLES: 1812-1870. English Novelist.
NOVEL: Bleak House
NOVEL: Great Expectations
NOVEL: Hard Times
NOVEL: Little Dorrit
NOVEL: Oliver Twist
NOVEL: Pickwick Papers
NOVEL: A Tale of Two Cities
DOCTOROW, E.L.: 1931-_

. American Editor and Novelist.

NOVEL: The Book of Daniel
DOSTOEVSKY,

FEODOR

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/2

MIKHAILOVICH.

1821-1881.

Russian

Gemmette: Law and Literature: An Unnecessarily Suspect Class in the Libera

1989]

LAW AND LITERATURE

Novelist.
NOVEL: Crime and Punishment
NOVEL: The Brothers Karamazov
DREISER, THEODORE: 1871-1945. American Novelist.
NOVEL: An American Tragedy
NOVEL: Sister Carrie
DUERRENMATT, FRIEDRICH: 1921-%_
Painter, and Critic.

Swiss Playwright, Author,

PLAY: The Visit
DUNNE, JOHN GREGORY: 1932--.
tion, and Script Writer.

American Non-fiction, Fic-

NOVEL: Dutch Shea Jr.
ELIOT, GEORGE (MARY ANN CROSS, NEE EVANS): 1819-1880.
English Novelist, Poet, and Translator.
NOVEL: Middlemarch
ELLISON, RALPH: 1914-_. American Novelist, Short Story Writer,
and Essayist.
NOVEL: Invisible Man
FULLER, LON L.: 1902-1978. American Educator and Author. Taught
Law for 48 Years.
FICTIONAL ETHICAL PROBLEM: "The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers," 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949).
FICTIONAL ETHICAL PROBLEM: "The Problem of the Grudge
Informers," In The Morality of Law.
GARDNER, ERLE STANLEY: 1889-1970. American Detective Novelist.
NOVEL: The Case of the Grinning Gorilla
GARLAND, HAMLIN: 1869-1940. American Novelist, Short Story
Writer, and Essayist.
SHORT STORY: "Under the Lion's Paw"
SHORT STORY: "Up the Coolly"
GILBERT, SIR WILLIAM SCHWENCK: 1836-1911. English Dramatist
and Humorous Verse Writer.
OPERA: Trail by Jury (Music by Sir Arthur Sullivan)
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 2

326

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

GLASPELL, SUSAN KEATING: 1882-1948. American Journalist, Playwright, Novelist, and Short Story Writer.
SHORT STORY: "A Jury of Her Peers"
GODWIN, WILLIAM: 1756-1836. English Writer of History, Biography,
Pamphlets, Treatises, Memoirs, Plays, Children's Books, Essays, and
Novels.
NOVEL: Things as They Are: The Adventures of Caleb Williams
(Ethico-political Theory and Narrative Plot)
. English Poet and Novelist.

GOLDING, WILLIAM: 1911-_
NOVEL: Lord of the Flies

HAMMETT, DASHIELL: 1894-1961. American Detective Novelist, Short
Story Writer, and Editor.
NOVEL: Red Harvest
HAWTHORNE, NATHANIEL: 1804-1864. American Novelist, Moralist,
and Allegorist.
NOVEL: The Scarlet Letter
HERSEY, JOHN: 1914- _

. American Writer and Novelist.

NOVEL: The Child Buyer
HIGGINS, GEORGE V.: 1939Novelist.

_

. American Short Story Writer and

NOVEL: The Friends of Eddie Coyle
NOVEL: Kennedy for the Defense
NOVEL: Penancefor Jerry Kennedy
HOWARD, SIDNEY COE: 1891-1939. American Playwright.
PLAY: Paths of Glory (From the Novel by Humphrey Cobb)
HUXLEY, ALDOUS: 1894-1963. English Novelist and Essayist.
NOVEL: Brave New World
IBSEN, HENRIK: 1828-1906. Norwegian Dramatist.
PLAY: An Enemy of the People
JAMES, HENRY: 1843-1916. American Novelist, Playwright, and Short
Story Writer.
NOVEL: The Bostonians
KAFKA, FRANZ: 1883-1924. European (Czech Origin) Novelist and
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Short Story Writer.
SHORT STORY: "The Hunger Artist"
STORIES AND SHORT PIECE: The Penal Colony
NOVEL: The Trial
KANTOR, MACKINLEY: 1904-1977. American Novelist and Short
Story Writer.
NOVEL: Andersonville
KESEY, KEN: 1935-

. American Novelist.

NOVEL: Once Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest
KOESTLER, ARTHUR: 1905-1983. Hungarian Novelist.
NOVEL: Darkness at Noon
LEE, HARPER: 1926-_

. American Novelist.

NOVEL: To Kill a Mockingbird
LEE ROBERT E(DWIN): 1918-%-. American Dramatist. JEROME
. American Professor, Director, and Playwright.
LAWRENCE: 1915PLAY: Inherit the Wind (Scopes "Monkey Trial")
LEVIN, MEYER: 1905-1981. American Journalist, Educator, Novelist,
Playwright, Screenwriter, Film Critic, Translator, and Editor.
NOVEL: Compulsion
LEVIN, MICHAEL GRAUBART: 1959Writer.

-.

American Lawyer and

NOVEL: The Socratic Method
LONDON, JOHN GRIFFITH (JACK): 1876-1916. American Novelist,
Short Story Writer, Political Essayist, and Playwright.
SHORT STORY: "Goodbye Jack"
NOVEL: The Star Rover
LUCAS, FRANK LAURENCE: 1894-1967. English Critic and Poet.
POEM: "Gilgamesh"
MAUGHAM, WILLIAM SOMERSET: 1874-1965. British Dramatist,
Novelist, and Short Story Writer.
SHORT STORY: "Rain"
MELVILLE, HERMAN: 1819-1891. American Novelist and Short Story
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Writer.
SHORT STORY: "Bartleby, the Scrivener"
SHORT STORY: "Benito Cereno"
NOVELLA: Billy Budd
MILLER, ARTHUR: 1915-_.

American Dramatist.

PLAY: The Crucible
MORRIS, NORVAL: 1923. Born in New Zealand. Former Dean
of University of Chicago Law School, Criminologist, and Writer.
SHORT STORY: "Ake Dah"
MORTIMER, JOHN: 1923--.
Novelist.

English Barrister, Playwright, and

COLLECTION OF SHORT STORIES: Rumpole and the Golden
Thread
COLLECTION OF SHORT STORIES: The Rumpole Omnibus
NICHOLS, JOHN TREADWELL: 1940-

.

American Novelist.

NOVEL: The Milagro Beanfield War
NORRIS, FRANK: 1870-1902. American Novelist.
NOVEL: Octopus
O'CONNOR, FLANNERY: 1925-1964. Novelist and Short Story Writer.
COLLECTION OF SHORT STORIES: A Good Man Is Hard to
Find
SHORT STORY: "The Lame Shall Enter First"
OLSEN, TILLIE: 1913-

. American Short Story Writer.

COLLECTION OF SHORT STORIES: Tell Me a Riddle
ORWELL, GEORGE (BLAIR, ERIC HUGH): 1903-1950. English Essayist, Novelist, Critic, and Journalist.
NOVEL: 1984
PATON, ALAN STEWART: 1903-_.
Short Story Writer.

South African Novelist and

NOVEL: Cry, the Beloved Country
PERCY, WALKER: 19167-.
and Writer of Medical Articles.
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NOVEL: The Thanatos Syndrome
PIELMEIER, JOHN. American Playwright.
PLAY: Agnes of God
POE, EDGAR ALLAN: 1809-1849. American Poet, Short Story Writer,
and Literary Critic.
POEM: "The Murders in the Rue Morgue"
POEM: "The Purloined Letter"
PORTER, KATHERINE ANNE: 1890-1980. American Short Story and
Novel Writer.
NOVEL: Ship of Fools
NOVEL: Noon Wine
RABELAIS, FRANCOIS: 1494-1553. French Humanistic Writer.
FICTION: Garantua et Pantagruel
RICE, ELMER: 1892-1967. American Playwright, Scenarist, and Director.
PLAY: Counsellor-at-Law
ROSE, REGINALD: 1920-_
Plays.

. American Writer of Drama and Screen

PLAY AND SCREEN-PLAY: Twelve Angry Men
SAMUELS, CHARLES: 1902-1982. American Journalist, Editor, Novelist, and Short Story Writer. (Written in corroboration with his wife, Louise
Samuels).
NOVEL: Girl in the Red Velvet Swing: The Story of Evelyn Nesbit,
Stanford White, and Harry K. Thaw
SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL: 1905-1980. French Existentialist, Philosopher,
Novelist, and Playwright.
PLAY: The Flies
SELZER, RICHARD: 1928--.
Short Stories and Essays.

American Surgeon and Writer of

SHORT STORY: "Tube Feeding"
SHAFFER, PETER (LEVIN): 1926-. English Playwright and
Critic. Published novels with his brother, Anthony Shaffer, under joint
pseudonym Peter Antony.
PLAY: Equus
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SHAKESPEARE, WILLIAM: 1564-1616. British Poet and Dramatist.
PLAY: Henry IV
PLAY: Henry V
PLAY: Henry VI
PLAY: Henry VIII
PLAY: Richard I
PLAY: Richard III
PLAY: King John
PLAY: King Lear
PLAY: Hamlet
PLAY: Measure for Measure
PLAY: The Merchant of Venice
SHAW, GEORGE BERNARD: 1856-1950. Irish Playwright.
PLAY: Murder in the Cathedral
PLAY: Saint Joan
SINCLAIR, UPTON: 1878-1968. American Novelist and Journalist.
NOVEL: The Jungle
SOLZHENITSYN, ALEKSANDR I(SAYEVICH): 1918Novelist, Short Story Writer, and Playwright.

. Russian

NOVEL: One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich
SOPHOCLES: 496(?)-406(?) B.C. Greek Writer of Tragic Plays.
PLAY: Antigone
PLAY: Oedipus Rex
STEINBECK, JOHN: 1902-1968. American Novelist and Short Story
Writer.
NOVEL: Cannery Row
NOVEL: Grapes of Wrath
STERNE, LAURENCE: 1713-1768. English Novelist.
NOVEL: Tristram Shandy
STEWART, GEORGE RIPPEY: 1895-1980. American Professor, Novelist, and Non-Fiction Writer.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/2
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NOVEL: Earth Abides
STONE, ROBERT: 1937(?)-

. American Novelist.

NOVEL: A Flagfor Sunrise
STOPPARD, TOM: Czechoslovakian Playwright, Novelist, Radio and TV
Scriptwriter.
PLAY: Rosencrantz and GuildernsternAre Dead
STOWE, HARRIET BEECHER: 1811-1896. American Religious Author,
Journalist, and Novelist.
NOVEL: Uncle Tom's Cabin
THOMPSON, HUNTER S(TOCKTON): 1939spondent and Writer.

. American Corre-

NOVEL: Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas
TOLSTOY, COUNT LEO NIKOLAEVICH: 1828-1910. Russian Novelist, Playwright, and Philosopher.
NOVEL: The Death of Ivan Ilyitch
NOVEL: Resurrection
TRAIN, ARTHUR R. (CHESNEY): 1875-1945. American Lawyer and
Author of Mystery Novels, Science Fiction, and Short Stories.
COLLECTION OF SHORT STORIES: The Adventure of Ephraim
Tutt
COLLECTION OF SHORT STORIES: Mr. Tutt at His Best
TRAVER, ROBERT (VOELKER, JOHN D(ONALDSON)):
__
. American Justice, Lawyer, and Author.

1903-

NOVEL: Anatomy of a Murder
TROLLOPE, ANTHONY: 1815-1882. English Novelist.
NOVEL: Orley Farm
TUROW, SCOTT: 1949-.
. American Lawyer and Writer of Short
Stories and Novels. Also wrote the non-fiction work One L: An Inside Account of Life in the First Year at Harvard Law School.
NOVEL: Presumed Innocent
TWAIN, MARK (SAMUEL LANGHORNE CLEMENS): 1835-1910.
American Humorist, Novelist, and Short Story Writer.
NOVEL: Huckleberry Finn
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NOVEL: Pudd'nhead Wilson
WALKER, WALTER (HERBERT III): 1949--.
and Novelist.

American Lawyer

NOVEL: Rules of the Knife Fight
WAMBAUGH, JOSEPH (ALOYSIUS, JR.): 1937-.
Novelist.

. American

NOVEL: The Onion Field
WARREN, ROBERT PENN: 1905-

__.

American Poet and Novelist.

NOVEL: All the King's Men
. American Novelist and

WATERS, FRANK (JOSEPH): 1902Non-fiction Writer.
NOVEL: The Man Who Killed the Deer

WEBSTER, JOHN: 1580-1625. English Dramatist.
PLAY: The White Divel
PLAY: The Devil's Law-case
WILLIAMS, WILLIAM CARLOS: 1883-1963. American Poet, Playwright, Novelist, Essayist, and Physician.
SHORT STORIES: The Doctor Stories (Ed. by Robert Coles)
WOLFE, T(H)OM(AS KENNERLY,
Writer, Social Commentator, and Artist.

JR.):

1931-

. American

NOVEL: The Bonfire of the Vanities
WRIGHT, RICHARD (NATHANIEL): 1908-1960. American Poet, Essayist, Novelist, and Short Story Writer.
NOVEL: Native Son
WOUK, HERMAN: 1915-

. American Novelist and Playwright.

PLAY: The Caine-Mutiny Court-Martial
NOVEL: The Caine-Mutiny
WORKS OF FICTION CITED MORE THAN ONCE
ANOUILH, Antigone (2)
BOLT, Man for All Seasons (3)
CAMUS, The Stranger (7)
COOPER, The Pioneers (2)
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COZZENS, The Just and the Unjust (2)
DICKENS, Bleak House (6); Great Expectations (2); Little Dorrit (2); A
Tale of Two Cities
DOCTOROW, The Book of Daniel (3)
DOSTOEVSKY, The Brothers Karamazov (2)
GLASPELL, "A Jury of Her Peers" (2)
GOLDING, Lord of the Flies (2)
KAFKA, The Trial (8)
KESEY, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest (2)
LEE, ROBERT, Inherit the Wind (2)
LEVIN, MEYER, Compulsion (3)
MELVILLE, "Bartleby, The Scrivener," (4); Billy Budd (11)
MILLER, The Crucible (5)
ROSE, Twelve Angry Men (2)
SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet (3); Measurefor Measure (5); The Merchant
of Venice (6)
SOLZHENITSYN, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (2)
SOPHOCLES, Antigone (5)
TRAVER, Anatomy of a Murder (3)
TWAIN, Huckleberry Finn (2); Pudd'nhead Wilson (3)
WRIGHT, Native Son (2)
NON-FICTION
. Long-time
ABBOTT, RUFUS HENRY (JACK HENRY): 1944-Prisoner in State and Federal Penitentiaries. American Writer.
In the Belly of the Beast: Letters From Prison
AUBREY, JOHN: 1626-1697. English Biographer.
Brief Lives and Other Selected Writings (Biography)
BAKER, JOHN HAMILTON: English Historian.
The Order of Serjeant's at Law (History)
BERMAN, HAROLD JOSEPH: 1918-%
Translator, and Writer.

. American Lawyer, Editor,

Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition
(History)
- . American Lawyer, Former
BOK, (DEREK) CURTIS: 1930of Harvard, Judge of the Suof
Harvard
Law
School,
25th
President
Dean
preme Court of Pennsylvania, Editor, and Writer.
Star Wormwood (Attack on Capital Punishment)
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BOSWELL, JAMES: 1740-1795. English Barrister and Man of Letters.
Letters and Journals
Life of Johnson
BUSCH, FRANCES X(AVIER): 1879-1975. American Trial Lawyer,
Corporation Counsel, Educator, and Author of Books on famous Criminal
Trials.
Enemies of the State (Trial)
Guilty or Not Guilty (Trial)
Prisoners at the Bar (Trial)
They Escaped the Hangman (Trial)
COKE, SIR EDWARD: 1552-1643. English Barrister and Writer of an
Explanation, Recasting and Defense of the Common Law Rules.
"The Case of the Monopolies"
DAVIDSON, CATHY N.: 1949-.
Writer.

American Professor, Editor, and

Revolution and the Word: The Rise of the Novel in America
DICKLER, GERALD: 1912-"

. American Attorney and Writer.

Man on Trial. History-Making Trialsfrom Socrates to Oppenheimer
ENRIGHT, D(ennis) J(oseph): 1920_. English Professor, Editor and
Writer of Autobiography, Poetry, Novels, and Essays.
Fairof Speech: The Uses of Euphemism, Pages 135-150.
FRANK, JOHN P(AUL): American Lawyer and Writer.
Marble Palace: The Supreme Court in American Life
GUTHRIE, WOODROW WILSON (WOODY): 1912-1967. American
Folksinger, Composer, and Author.
Bound for Glory (Autobiography)
HAMMURABI OR HAMMURAPI OR KHAMMURABI: King of
Babylonia who is thought to have reigned about 1750-1708 B.C.
Code of Hammurabi (Earliest Legal Code)
HOBBES, THOMAS: 1588-1679. English Philosopher, Translator, and
Prose Writer.
"A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common
Law of England." (Philosophy)
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HYDE, H(ARFORD) MONTGOMERY: 1907--_. Irish-born Lawyer
Practicing at the English Bar, Editor, and Writer.
Their Good Names (Trial)
KALVEN, HARRY: 1914-1974. American Lawyer, Educator, Author of
Books on the Judicial Process. HANS ZEISEL: 1905.. Czechoslavakian-Born Professor of Law and Sociology and Writer of Non-Fiction.
The American Jury (Describes 3,567 Trials and Considers the Decision-Making Process of Juries)
KUNSTLER, WILLIAM M(OSES): 1919. American Lawyer,
Scriptwriter, and Non-Fiction Writer.
And Justicefor All (Trial)
LUSTGARTEN, EDGAR (MARCUS): 1907-1978. English Barrister,
Free-lance Writer and Broadcaster. Writer of Novels, Radio Plays, Screenplays, and Non-Fiction.
The Woman in the Case (Trial)
MORE, SIR THOMAS: 1478-1535. English Humorist and Translator.
Utopia (Philosophy)
NIZER, LOUIS: 1902. English-born American Attorney, Writer
of Legal Essays, Legal Textbooks, Drama, and Non-Fiction Trials.
My Life in Court (Trial-Adapted as a 3-Act Play by Henry Denker
and Produced as A Case of Libel)
The Jury Returns (Trial)
PALMER, ROBERT C(harles): 1947-.__. American Historian and
Writer.
The County Courts of Medieval England: 1150-1350 (History)
PATTERSON, L(YMAN) R(AY): 1929--.
American Lawyer, Professor, Former Dean of Emory University School of Law, and Writer.
Copyright in Historical Perspective (History)
PIRSIG, ROBERT M.: 1928-.
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry Into Values
(Autobiography)
POWELL, ANTHONY: 1905Editor.

. English Novelist, Scriptwriter, and

John Aubrey and His Friends (Biography)
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ST. GERMAIN, CHRISTOPHER: 1460(?)-1540. English Barrister and
Writer.
The Doctor and the Student (Philosophical Dialogue)
SARTRE, JEAN PAUL: 1905-1980. French Existentialist, Philosopher,
Novelist, and Playwright.
On Being and Nothingness (Philosophy)
SIMON, James F.: 1938.Professor.

. American Lawyer, Editor, Writer, and

Independent Journey: The Life of William 0. Douglas
SIMPSON, A(LFRED) BRIAN: 1931--. English Historian and
Writer.
Cannibalism and the Common Law (History)
SOLZHENITSYN, ALEKSANDR I(SAYEVICH): 1918--.
Novelist, Short Story Writer, and Playwright.

Russian

"Commencement Address"
SWIFT, JONATHAN: 1667-1745. Irish Novelist, Satirist, Poet, and
Pamphleteer.
A Modest Proposal
THAW, HARRY KENDALL: 1871-1947. Murder Defendant.
The Traitor: Being the Untampered with, Unrevised Account of the
Trial and All That Led Up To It.
ZOLA, EMILE: 1840-1902. French Naturalist, Novelist, Critic, Journalist,
and Playwright.
Truth (Disquisition)
LITERARY CRITICISM
SYMPOSIUM PARTICIPANTS:
"Interpretation Symposium," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985).
SYMPOSIUM PARTICIPANTS:
"Symposium: Law and Literature," 60 TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982).
BANDER, EDWARD J.:
"Legal Humor Dissected," 75 LAW LIBR. 289 (1982)
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COVER, ROBERT M.:
"Violence and the Word: In Tribute to Charles L. Black, Jr.," 95
YALE L. REV.

1601 (1986).

DERRIDA, JACQUES:
Of Grammatology
DWORKIN, ANDREA:
Woman Hating: A Radical Look at Sexuality
DWORKIN, RONALD M.:
"How Law is Like Literature," in A Matter of Principle
"Law As Interpretation," 60 TEX L. REV. 527 (1982).
Law's Empire
FISH, S.:
Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive
Communities
"Fish v. Fiss." 36 STAN L. REV. 1325 (1984).
FISS, 0.:
"The Death of Law?" 72 CORN. L. REV. 1 (Nov. 1986).
"Objectivity and Interpretation." 34 STAN L. REV. 739 (1982).
FOUCAULT, MICHEL:
Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison
"What is An Author," in Textual Strategies
FRIED, CHARLES:
Contract as Promise: A Theory or Contractual Obligation
GRAFF, GERALD:
"Keep Off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies," 60
TEX. L. REV. 405 (1982).
HUFF, THOMAS:
"The Temptations of Creon: Philosophical Reflections on the Ethics of
the Lawyer's Professional Role, 46 MONT. L. REV. 47 (1985).
KELLER, KEVIN L.:
"Direct Evidence of State of Mind: A Philosophical Analysis of How
Facts in Evidence Support Conclusions Regarding Mental State," 1985
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Wis. L. REV. 435.

KELMAN, MARK G.:
"The Politics of Explaining Crime," 31 STAN. L. REv. 527 (1979).
KENNEDY, DUNCAN:
"Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication," 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976).

LEDBETTER,JACK W.:
"The Trial of BILLY BUDD, FORETOPMAN," 58 A.B.A. J. 614 (1972).
LEVINSON, SANFORD:
"Law as Literature," 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982).
LUBAN, D.:
"Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus
and Plato," 54 TENN. L. REV. 279 (1987).
MACKINNON, C.:
"Towards Feminist Jurisprudence," 34 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1982).
PAPKE, DAVID R.:
"Neo-Marxists, Nietzcheans, and New Critics: The Voices of the Contemporary Law and Literature Discourse," 1985 Am. B. Found. Res. J.
883.
POSNER, RICHARD A.:
"The Economics of the Baby Shortage," 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
"Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued," 72 VA. L. REV. 1351
(1986).
Law and Literature:A MisunderstoodRelation
"The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West,"
99 HARV. L. REV. 1431 (1986).
STICK, JOHN:
"Literary Imperialism: Assessing the Results of Dworkin's Interpretive
Turn in Law's Empire," 34 UCLA L. REV. 371 (1986).
UNGER, ROBERTO MANGABEIRA:
Knowledge and Politics
WEISBERG, RICHARD H.:
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Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern Fiction
WEST, ROBIN:
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